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INTRODUCTION 
It is now axiomatic that the media informs and shapes the public’s opi-
nion about crime and criminal justice.  The catch phrase “if it bleeds, it 
leads” continues to embody and animate the sentiment that guides much of 
the editorial judgment about the stories that newspapers should report on 
their front pages or that local and national television news should feature.  
Indeed, the media’s fascination—and even obsession—with crime has gar-
nered considerable scholarly attention and commentary.1  Studies have 
demonstrated the strong correlation between the amount of media coverage 
on a particular topic with public knowledge and interest on that topic.  
When it comes to crime coverage, television programming not only tends 
to suggest that crime happens at greater frequency than it does, but it also 
exaggerates the amount of violent crime in the world relative to property 
crime.2  The exaggeration effect of this coverage is that the public perceives 
the world as a much more violent and personally dangerous place than ac-
tual crime statistics would support. 
So-called “reality shows” only add to the perception of ever-present 
danger.  These shows often tantalize viewers with actual footage of police 
crime investigations or dramatic reenactments of the real-life experiences 
of police officers, suspects, and EMT workers.  Even crime dramas that do 
not purport to be reality shows adhere to the proven marketing gimmick 
that they are only slightly fictionalized versions of what actually happens 
on our streets.  As in any dramatic presentation, the overriding goal of these 
 
 1. See MICHAEL HOUGH & JULIAN V. ROBERTS, HOME OFFICE RESEARCH CENTER 9 
(1998); Alexis Miller et al., College Students’ Perceptions of Crime, Prison and Prisoners, 
17 CRIM. J. STUDIES 311, 313-14 (2004) (citing GEORGE GERBNER, THE KILLING SCREENS: 
MEDIA AND THE CULTURE OF VIOLENCE (1994)); see also, e.g., MICHAEL HOUGH & JULIAN 
V. ROBERTS, HOME OFFICE RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND STATISTICS DIRECTORATE, FIND-
INGS—CONFIDENCE IN JUSTICE: AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW IN FINDINGS (2004), available 
at http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs04/r243.pdf. 
 2. See STEVEN M. CHERMAK, VICTIMS IN THE NEWS: CRIME AND THE AMERICAN NEWS 
MEDIA 4 (1995); George Gerbner & Larry Gross, Living With Television: The Violence Pro-
file, 26 J. COMM. 172, 177-81 (1976); W. James Potter & W. Ware, An Analysis of the Con-
texts of Antisocial Acts on Prime-Time Television, 14 COMM. RES. 664 (1987). 
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shows is to create a dramatic effect rather than an accurate portrayal.  But 
by offering the viewing public an “insider’s” look at the gritty reality of 
law enforcement, the public understandably believes it is glimpsing a reali-
ty over which they have little control and much to fear.  More often than 
not, these narratives adopt the perspective of law enforcement3 and depict 
crime as both random and the result of individual pathology rather than 
larger social ills such as poverty, racism, and unemployment.4  The goal of 
both reality and real-life crime dramas is to create a visceral impact on the 
public, but the unintended effect is that these dramatic renderings at once 
affect and shape public perceptions of actual crime and fuel the public’s be-
lief that tough legislative responses offer the public its only opportunity to 
gain control over an environment in which crime runs rampant.5  Thus, un-
less the general public has access to strong countervailing sources of in-
formation on crime, their perceptions will be influenced perhaps subcons-
ciously by these skewed inputs. 
Not only traditional media informs the public’s views.  Studies have do-
cumented that more than two hundred million people in the United States 
consider themselves regular users of the Internet.6  As the public gravitates 
away from traditional media toward newer media7—websites, blogs, You-
Tube—we see that these outlets continue to reflect a public fascination with 
crime.  The problem is that whether one focuses on traditional or newer 
media, the public tends toward news media that confirms rather than chal-
lenges their views.8 
 
 3. See Sarah Eschholz et al., Race and Attitudes Toward the Police: Assessing the Ef-
fects of Watching “Reality” Police Programs, 30 J. CRIM. JUSTICE 327, 331 (2002). 
 4. See Gray Cavender & Lisa Bond-Maupin, Fear and Loathing on Reality Television: 
An Analysis of “America’s Most Wanted” and “Unsolved Mysteries,” 63 SOCIOLOGICAL 
INQUIRY 305, 305-17 (1993); see also Gray Cavender & Mark Fishman, Television Reality 
Crime Programs: Context and History, in ENTERTAINING CRIME 1-18 (M. Fishman & G. 
Cavender eds., 1998); Aaron Doyle, ‘Cops’: Television Policing and Policing Reality, in 
ENTERTAINING CRIME 96-116 (M. Fishman & G. Cavender eds., 1998). 
 5. See Eschholz, supra note 3. 
 6. See Carl Bialik, Numbers Show China Beats U.S. in Net Use, but Which Numbers?, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2008, at B1 (specifying that in 2007 the United States had over two 
hundred million users of the Internet  and “71% of heads of households use[d] the Inter-
net”). 
 7. See Zogby Poll: 67% View Traditional Journalism as “Out of Touch,” ZOGBY INT’L 
(Feb. 27, 2008), www.zogby.com/news/readnews.cfm?ID=1454 (citing study conducted by 
We Media/Zogby Interactive in which nearly half of respondents indicated that the Internet 
is their primary source of news). 
 8. See Debra Burns Melican et al., News on the Net: Internet News Credibility and its 
Role in Promoting Racial Stereotypes (June 16, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://www.allacademic.com/one/www/research/index.php?click_key=1&PHPSESSID=5 
694e699d482f0d013f2a4fe259f7d41 (follow “PDF” hyperlink) (documenting selective ex-
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Why should we care?  Apart from a general concern about the quality of 
information on which the public relies, the more specific concern is that 
media affects not only public opinion but public policy.  As the public’s 
principal exposure to—and information about—crime either comes from 
media sound bites or downloads from selected Internet sources that mirror 
and amplify existing views,9 the difficulty of separating fact from hype be-
comes all the more challenging and all the more acute.  Informed public 
policy demands at a minimum rigorous debate and ideas driven by evi-
dence rather than heat.  Criminal justice policy without a grounded eviden-
tiary basis holds serious implications for both the public perception of ef-
fective public policy, and the administration of criminal justice policy.  
Comments by the Attorney General of the United States, Eric Holder, indi-
cating that we “need to get smart on crime”10 suggest that we need to move 
from “criminal justice policy”11 focused on sound-bites to a greater focus 
on evidence-based practices that have statistically proven track records. 
This Article responds to that call for action.  Part I demonstrates the 
ways the media drives and shapes legislation and exposes some of the im-
plications of sound bite public policy-making in criminal justice.  Part II 
takes an in-depth look at the process of shaping public perceptions of 
crime.  This Part will explore the ways that conceptions of crime are 
formed and influenced.  It will then examine ways that the media influ-
ences legislation.  Part III discusses the need for oversight of the media and 
legislature in addressing the concerns of excessive media influence in poli-
cy-making.  Ultimately, the introduction of social media and its impact may 
provide some of the answers. 
 
posure to media stories and outlets that support the user’s own beliefs and values with a ten-
dency to view those sources as more credible). 
 9. See id. 
 10. Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks at the ABA Convention (Aug. 3, 2009), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech-090803.html.  In his 
speech, Attorney General Holder further clarified his comments by suggesting that:  
Getting smart on crime requires talking openly about which policies have worked 
and which have not.  And we have to do so without worrying about being labeled 
as too soft or too hard on crime.  Getting smart on crime means moving beyond 
useless labels and catch-phrases, and instead relying on science and data to shape 
policy.  And getting smart on crime means thinking about crime in context—not 
just reacting to the criminal act, but developing the government’s ability to en-
hance public safety before the crime is committed and after the former offender is 
returned to society. 
Id. 
 11. See id. 
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I.  MEDIA INFORMS AND DISTORTS PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME 
The news media remains one of the most important and influential se-
condhand sources of public information.  At the same time, it serves as a 
major contributor to public misperception and anxiety about crime.  In one 
national survey, eighty-one percent of respondents reported that their per-
ception of crime as a social problem derived from what they had seen in the 
news.12  And as the media draws the public’s attention to crime, it also fu-
els the public’s fear of crime.  Studies demonstrate that media coverage can 
lead the public into a “moral panic”—an episode of “sharply increased pub-
lic anxiety about the threat some group or condition poses to society’s val-
ues and well being.”13  Unjustified panic should be a sufficient cause for 
alarm.  But when that increased fear of crime makes citizens more willing 
to accept and insist on extremely harsh criminal justice policies to satisfy 
their desire to strike out against the problem over which they believe they 
have too little control, the media’s subtle yet pervasive influence becomes 
more troubling. 
Spikes and variations in public perception of crime over time can also be 
traced to the media.14  In the 1990s, for example, Gallup poll results indi-
cated a sharp increase in the salience of crime in the public discourse.15  
From March 1992 to August 1994, the number of respondents who named 
crime as the most important national problem increased from a mere five 
percent to more than fifty percent, with numbers remaining high for the 
remainder of the decade.16  On the basis of FBI crime statistics and analys-
es of television news variables (including the length of crime stories, mean 
story rank, and the number of stories), researchers calculated that the latter 
data “accounted for almost four times more variance in public perceptions 
of crime as the MIP [most important problem] than did actual crime 
rates.”17  While the magnitude of the results may not be generalizable (the 
researchers acknowledge a potentially distortive “O.J. effect”18 in the wake 
of comprehensive coverage of one of the most well-publicized criminal tri-
als in recent memory), the underlying premise is sound.  The amount of 
 
 12.  See Sara Sun Beale, The News Media’s Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How 
Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 441 (2006). 
 13. See id. at 456. 
 14. See Dennis T. Lowry et al., Setting the Public Fear Agenda: A Longitudinal Analy-
sis of Network TV Crime Reporting, Public Perceptions of Crime, and FBI Statistics, 53 J. 
COMM. 61 (2003). 
 15. See generally G.H. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL MONTHLY REPORT (REPORT NO. 285) 
(1994). 
 16. See Lowry et al., supra note 14, at 61. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 71. 
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screen time devoted to crime, rather than length of individual stories or 
their order of presentation, appears to be of primary importance.19 
While there is considerable academic disagreement on the primary me-
chanism of crime perception formation, the “agenda-setting” influence of 
media exposure—i.e., its ability to “tell people what to think about”20—is 
well documented.  Local television is still the primary source of news for 
most Americans.21  It is a medium subject to frequent research, usually 
through self-reporting or experimental manipulations.  A few recent ana-
lyses are illustrative.  A national survey conducted in 1997 found that local 
news broadcasts “raise[] the perceived risk of crime above other risks also 
covered in the media.”22  Similarly, a localized survey of Philadelphia resi-
dents the next year found that the more respondents watched television 
news, the more likely they were to report crime as a problem in their city.23  
Taken in tandem, these results suggest that local news viewing correlates 
with increased concern about crime, regardless of local crime rates and 
with many personal characteristics held constant.24  This last finding is im-
portant, as certain demographics are more likely to express concern about 
crime, notwithstanding external factors.25 
A. Distorting Effect of Extensive Media Coverage of Crime 
Where actual crimes occur, we see the media’s coverage and corres-
ponding influence in sharp relief.  Media will choose which crimes to cov-
er, and, thereby, determine which incidents to highlight and expose to the 
public and policy makers.  The choice to cover a crime at all suggests signi-
ficance: of all the crimes that occur in a major metropolitan area, for exam-
ple, the one featured in the media somehow seemed noteworthy.  Then the 
degree of coverage suggests a level of importance and shapes the percep-
tion that such incidents have significance.  Equally as important: the degree 
 
 19. See id. at 72. 
 20. Kimberly Gross & Sean Aday, The Scary World in Your Living Room and Neigh-
borhood: Using Local Broadcast News, Neighborhood Crime Rates, and Personal Expe-
rience to Test Agenda Setting and Cultivation, 53 J. COMM. 411, 412 (2003). 
 21. See Daniel Romer et al., Television News and the Cultivation of Fear of Crime, 53 J. 
COMM. 88, 93 (2003). 
 22. Id. at 94. 
 23. See id. at 98. 
 24. See id. at 88.  Similar results can be found with slight variations throughout social 
science literature. See, e.g., Gross & Aday, supra note 20, at 423 (concluding that people 
who report watching “a lot of broadcast news” are most likely to report crime as the most 
important problem facing their neighborhood). 
 25. In one telephone survey, women, African-Americans, younger respondents, and less 
educated respondents were more likely to name crime as an important problem. See id. at 
418. 
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of coverage determines public perception of the frequency of crime.26  Re-
peated media coverage of certain types of offenses can lead the public to 
believe they are witnessing disturbing patterns or trends about which the 
general public and political leaders ought to be concerned.27 
 Of course, media coverage remains a critical component in keeping 
the public informed about its surroundings.  Quite obviously, no single in-
dividual can possibly know all the information necessary to make policy 
decisions or rely solely on evidence distilled from personal experience.28  
Our nation is simply too large, our capabilities too small, and our expe-
riences too confined to relatively narrow bands.  Therefore, we depend on 
secondhand sources of information to enable us to see and make sense of 
events that occur outside of our day to day experience.  This is true not on-
ly in remote locations, but in central cities and densely populated areas.  
We look to the media to provide information and fill in context that we 
might otherwise lack.  But tendencies to exaggerate violent crime29 and de-
vote disproportionate coverage to particular dangers30 belie actual crime 
statistics and unjustifiably increase general fears.  Research suggests these 
effects are exacerbated by sensationalist, episodic reporting and increased 
exposure to media sources.31 
A few examples help to illustrate the effect and the concern.  The “unre-
lenting” coverage of child abduction cases and school violence, for exam-
ple, increases the public sense that such incidents are common and prone to 
happen anywhere,32 though in fact stranger abduction is rare,33 and kids are 
statistically safer in school than elsewhere.34  The emphasis on “stranger 
danger” diverts attention away from more significant risks, like abuse by a 
 
 26. See Beale, supra note 12, at 457. 
 27. See id. at 443. 
 28. See, e.g., Stuart Macaulay, Popular Legal Culture: An Introduction, 98 YALE L.J. 
1545, 1551-52 (1989). 
 29. Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr. et al., Crime in Black and White: The Violent, Scary World 
of Local News, 1 HARV. INT’L J. PRESS/POL. 6, 8 (1996). 
 30. Child abductions are one prominent example. See, e.g., Tonya L. Brito, Paranoid 
Parents, Phantom Menaces, and the Culture of Fear, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 519. 
 31. See Sarah Eschholz, The Media and Fear of Crime: A Survey of the Research, 9 U. 
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 50 (1997) (“[F]or newspaper consumption the character of the 
message is important: local, random, and sensational stories evoke the most fear, whereas, 
distant, specific, and less sensational stories may have a calming effect on individuals.  For 
television, the quantity of television viewed in general, violent programming in particular, 
and certain audience characteristics are generally associated with higher levels of fear.”). 
 32. Brito, supra note 30, at 523. 
 33. See id. at 524. 
 34. See id. at 525. 
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child’s own family and friends.35  The media has also focused considerable 
attention on juvenile crime.  Through an intense and persistent focus on 
sensational incidences of juvenile violence, the media has fostered and fed 
the belief that children today are more aggressive and dangerous than at 
any other point in our history.36  This perception has gained traction not-
withstanding the fact that the juvenile crime rate has remained stable or de-
creased in the last decade.37 
Such misconceptions can have serious consequences for particular 
groups of offenders.  A recent Internet survey conducted in multiple states 
indicated gross misconceptions about sex offenders.38  Respondents typi-
cally believe that: (1) most sex offenders reoffend; (2) treatment is ineffec-
tive; and (3) juvenile sex offenders are themselves victims of sexual abuse 
as children.39  Moreover, a “substantial minority” believes offenders prey 
on kids in schoolyards and playgrounds.40  These stereotypes are at odds 
with data provided by the authors: the Bureau of Justice statistics indicate 
relatively low recidivism rates and suggest most children are victimized by 
people known to them, only about thirty percent of adult offenders have 
been victimized, and the majority of sexually abused children do not them-
selves become offenders.41  As many of the respondents indicated that most 
 
 35. See id. 
 36. See, e.g., Lori Dorfman & Vincent Schiraldi, BUILDING BLOCKS FOR YOUTH, Off 
Balance: Youth, Race & Crime in the News (2001), available at http://www.hawaii.edu/hiv 
andaids/Off_Balance__Youth,_Race_and_Crime_in_the_News.pdf. 
 37. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 5 (1998).  Professor Zimring 
has utilized an analysis that attempts to explain the public’s overestimate of juvenile crime.  
“In 1996, the total rate of juvenile arrests for Index crimes of violence other than aggravated 
assault was lower than in 1980.” Id. at 47; see also HUGH D. BARLOW & THEODORE N. FER-
DINAND, UNDERSTANDING DELINQUENCY 9 figs.1.1 & 1.2 (1992); JAMES T. CAREY & PA-
TRICK D. MCANANY, INTRODUCTION TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: YOUTH AND THE LAW 17 
(1984); Kathleen M. Laubenstein, Comment, Media Access to Juvenile Justice: Should 
Freedom of the Press Be Limited to Promote Rehabilitation of Youthful Offenders?, 68 
TEMP. L. REV. 1897 (1995). 
 38. See Stacey Katz-Schiavone et al., Myths and Facts About Sexual Violence: Public 
Perceptions and Implications for Prevention, 15 J. CRIM. JUSTICE & POPULAR CULTURE 291 
(2008). 
 39. See id. at 305. 
 40. Id. (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF 
YOUNG CHILDREN AS REPORTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT: VICTIM, INCIDENT, AND OFFENDER 
CHARACTERISTICS (NO. NCJ 182990) (2000)). 
 41. Id. (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OF-
FENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994 (NO. NCJ 198281) (2003); R.K. Hanson & S. Sla-
ter, Sexual Victimization in the History of Child Sexual Abusers: A Review, 1 ANNALS OF 
SEX RES. 485-99 (1988); Lisa L. Sample & Timothy M. Bray, Are Sex Offenders Danger-
ous?, 3 CRIMINOLOGY PUB. POL’Y 59-82 (2003); Lisa L. Sample & Timothy M. Bray, Are 
Sex Offenders Different? An Examination of Rearrest Patterns, 17 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 
83-102 (2006); CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., WHAT COMMUNITY MEMBERS NEED TO 
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of their perceptions of sex offenders come from the media,42 the authors 
speculate that the media “sustain[] myths by portraying sexual offenders as 
a homogenous group of criminals who are incurable and highly predato-
ry.”43  While the authors view such misrepresentations as a barrier to effec-
tive prevention,44 they also call into question the legitimacy of the criminal 
justice responses they have spawned, such as blanket sex offender registra-
tion laws.45 
Researchers have documented the media’s concentrated focus on vi-
olence against the person as causing additional distortions.46  One survey of 
Los Angeles television news found that crime coverage focused on violent 
crime rather than property or white-collar crime in circumstances where the 
majority of the time, the alleged assailant was a non-white male.47  A Chi-
cago study of local news concluded that Chicago-area television news fo-
cused overwhelmingly on incidents of violence where the alleged offenders 
were people of color.48  Conceptions of crime formed in one’s own com-
munity are similarly susceptible to inaccuracies and exaggerations, but of a 
distinct character.  In neighborhoods where gang activity is prevalent, for 
 
KNOW ABOUT SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEX OFFENDERS (2000), available at http://www.csom. 
org/train/educating/one/files/1content_teaching.pdf). 
 42. Id. at 304 (citing CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., Facts About Sex Offending Beha-
vior: True or False Quiz (2000), available at http://www.csom.org/train/educating/one/files/ 
true_false_quiz.pdf). 
 43. Id. at 306. 
 44. Id. at 305 (“This popular notion can potentially interfere with parents’ ability to pro-
tect their children by reinforcing fear of strangers and inhibiting awareness of common ways 
that sex offenders gain access to child victims through familiarity and dependence on care-
takers.”). 
 45. Id. 
 46. See RICHARD V. ERICSON ET AL., REPRESENTING ORDER: CRIME, LAW, AND JUSTICE IN 
THE NEWS MEDIA 244-47 (1991) (discussing a study that shows stories about violence 
against the person constitute at least one-third of popular newspaper, television, and radio 
stories); PHILIP SCHLESINGER & HOWARD TUMBER, REPORTING CRIME: THE MEDIA POLITICS 
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 140 (1994) (“Of the totality of crime covered by the press and televi-
sion in Britain, violent crime against the person is given disproportionate attention by all 
news outlets.”).  This is especially true in cases involving serial killers. See, e.g., PHILIP 
JENKINS, USING MURDER: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SERIAL HOMICIDE 220-23 (1994) 
(explaining that serial murder stories are especially attractive to media because they create 
an emotional response, communicate a threat, and have shock value). 
 47. See Franklin Gilliam, Jr. & Shanto Iyengar, Prime Suspects: The Influence of Local 
Television News on the Viewing Public, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 560 (2000). 
 48. See Robert M. Entman, Blacks in the News: Television, Modern Racism and Cultur-
al Change, 69 JOURNALISM Q. 341 (1992).  One analysis of photographic images from the 
national and sports news sections of three California newspapers revealed that “[f]emale, 
Latino, and Asian individuals were disproportionately underrepresented, while black indi-
viduals were over-represented,” but most often in sports or criminal roles. Tara-Nicole 
Beasley DeLouth et al., Gender and Ethnic Role Portrayals: Photographic Images in Three 
California Newspapers, 76 PSYCHOL. REP 493 (1995). 
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example, non-members may imitate behaviors of members to appear less 
vulnerable, creating the impression of more widespread gang member-
ship.49  This, in turn, can increase the pressure on adolescents to join gangs 
and engage in associated criminality.50  Indeed, perceptions of widespread 
criminal activity in one’s social group can influence the decision to commit 
crime.51 
1. Public Policy as an Expression of Powerlessness and Outrage 
As the public’s fear of crime mounts, it often looks for ways to express 
its moral outrage against crime and to gain some command over actions 
that seem too often beyond its control.  Thus, with media coverage of par-
ticularly violent crimes, the public understandably feels the need to lash out 
and punish.52  When the media covers the actions of law enforcement offi-
cials or political officials who seem to be willing to embrace punitive poli-
cies, the public will often gravitate toward those officials.53  Media cover-
age of sensational crimes over the past decade has often contributed to a 
political agenda that looks to emphasize retributive responses to crime and 
to insist on longer penalties to incapacitate offenders all in the service of 
reducing the supposed frequency of such crimes.54  As we see extensive 
media coverage of the tragic mass killings and critical injury to Representa-
tive Gabrielle Giffords in Tucson, Arizona, we once again see renewed 
calls for punitive responses as though such violent episodes were not 
unique but were instead emblematic of the types of crime that occur on a 
daily basis in our grocery stores and neighborhoods.55 
Sensationalist reporting not only draws attention to particular crimes, it 
also too frequently skews public policy.  Megan’s Law,56 a sex offender 
registration measure, offers an example.  In response to lobbying by the ti-
 
 49. See Amanda S. Riley, Beep! You’re Guilty! The Constitutionality of Pager Ban Pro-
visions in Gang Injunctions, 31 W. ST. U. L. REV. 79, 92 (2003). 
 50. See Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner 
City, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 805, 820 (1998). 
 51. Id. at 814-15. 
 52. See, e.g., Beale, supra note 12, at 442. 
 53. See, e.g., Douglas N. Husak, The Problem of Criminalization, 205 N.J. LAWYER 18, 
20 (2000) (“Our policies and practices are based less on their merits than on what will gain 
approval for politicians.  Few public officials have lost votes by being tough on crime, or by 
being perceived as being tough on crime.”). 
 54. See Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospects for Restorative Justice in the 
United States, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 413, 427. 
 55. See, e.g., Associated Press, Giffords Intern Supports Gun Control in NYC Visit, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/AP2f7c2e16d30f4b4eb88966db575 
517e8.html. 
 56. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 (West 1994). 
THOMPSON_CHRISTENSEN 4/9/2011  8:20 PM 
2011] FROM SOUND BITES TO SOUND POLICY 785 
tular victim’s family, New Jersey passed the legislation quickly and with 
little deliberation.57  Similar bills in other states followed, further increas-
ing public awareness of the targeted danger.58  Whether one considers Me-
gan’s Law, Jenna’s Law, or other legislation named for its victims, a famil-
iar pattern emerges.  No one stops to question whether the law, as enacted, 
effectively meets the objectives set out in the legislation.  Nor do we see 
any meaningful debate about practices with a proven track record of suc-
cess.  Instead, the media wants blood. 
When the public feels less in control of the situation, it becomes more 
open to draconian approaches to crime control.59  As Professor David Gar-
land notes: 
[T]he new political imperative is that victims must be protected; their 
voices must be heard, their memory honoured, their anger expressed, their 
 
 57. Robert E. Freeman-Longo, Revisiting Megan’s Law and Sex Offender Registration: 
Prevention or Problem, in SEXUAL VIOLENCE: POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND CHALLENGES IN 
THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 223, 224 (James F. Hodgson & Debra S. Kelley eds. 
2004). 
 58. See, e.g., Sean’s Law, 2002 N.Y. Laws ch. 571 (ensuring the prompt suspension of a 
junior driver’s license or permit when a junior driver is charged with alcohol-related traffic 
offenses); Stephanie’s Law, 2003 N.Y. Laws ch. 69 (prohibiting surreptitious surveillance 
without consent and disseminating and unlawful recording thereof and amends the Correc-
tion Law in relation to the Sex Offender Registration Act); Bill Leaf-Brandi Woods Law, 
2006 N.Y. Laws ch. 245 (increasing the penalties for Vehicular Assault and Vehicular Man-
slaughter when committed by persons who have previously been convicted of an alcohol or 
drug-related driving while intoxicated or impaired charge within the previous ten years); 
Increased Penalties for Shaken Baby Crimes: Cynthia’s Law, 2006 N.Y. Laws ch. 110 (add-
ing a new crime of Reckless Assault of a Child, a class D violent felony—a person who is 
eighteen years of age or more commits this new crime if he or she recklessly causes serious 
physical injury to the brain of a child less than five years old by shaking the child, or by 
slamming or throwing the child so as to impact the child’s head on a hard surface or object); 
Craig J. Todeschini Unlawful Fleeing a Police Officer, 2006 N.Y. Laws ch. 738 (amending 
the penal law to criminalize the action of refusing to obey directions to stop by police and 
recklessly fleeing in a motor vehicle where such action results in injury or death to another, 
by creating three new crimes—Unlawful Fleeing a Police Officer in a Motor Vehicle in the 
first, second, and third degrees, as D felony, E felony, and A misdemeanor crimes, respec-
tively).  Craig Todeschini, age twenty-five, died April 23, 2006 when he crashed into a tree 
while chasing a motorcyclist going more than one hundred miles an hour through Pompey, 
fifteen miles south of Syracuse.  The Amber Alert Plan is named in honor of nine-year old 
Amber Hagerman who was abducted and brutally murdered in 1996.  Spurred by communi-
ty outcry over Amber’s tragic death, the Amber Alert Plan was created to serve as a quick 
and ready response to any child abduction.  Since its creation, law enforcement officials 
have successfully utilized the plan to achieve the safe return of lost and abducted children. 
 59. See, e.g., Megan’s Law Strengthened: 2006 N.Y. Laws ch. 1. This law requires level 
one sex offenders to register for twenty years and level two sex offenders, in addition to lev-
el three sex offenders and sex offenders with a designation, to register for life; authorizes 
certain level two sex offenders to petition for relief from registering after they have been 
registered for thirty years; and eliminates the petition for relief for certain level three sex 
offenders. 
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fears addressed.  The naming of criminal laws and penal measures for 
crime victims (Megan’s law, Jenna’s law, Stephanie’s law, and most re-
cently the British press campaign for “Sarah’s law”) purports to honour 
them in this way, though there is undoubtedly an element of exploitation 
here too, as the individual’s name is used to fend off objections to meas-
ures that are often nothing more than retaliatory legislation passed for 
public display and political advantage.60 
The consequence of the sort of intense media coverage of crime and the 
public reaction to that crime has been a shift in the public debate “away 
from the instrumental reasoning of crime control analysis towards the vis-
ceral emotions of identification and righteous indignation.  Once this shift 
has been effected, the terms of the debate are transformed and ‘facts’ be-
come ‘less persuasive than the moral authority of grief.’”61 
2. Media’s Influence on the Perceptions of Leniency 
More direct evidence of media’s substantive effects on the public’s crim-
inal justice perceptions may be found in empirical analysis of sentencing 
views.  In one study, respondents’ perception of the appropriateness of a 
particular criminal sentence was shaped by which version of a news media 
account they read (one of three).62  While most respondents believed that 
the sentence imposed by the judge was too lenient, those exposed to the 
tabloid newspaper report expressed the greatest dissatisfaction.63  Moreo-
ver, exposure to a single sentencing story affected respondents’ view of 
overall sentencing practices—evidence of media’s “generalizing effect.”64  
A related study found that respondents who learned about sentencing by 
reading a summary of court documents prepared by researchers were much 
less likely to hold negative views of both the offender and the sentence im-
posed than respondents who read a media account of the same hearing—by 
 
 60. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CON-
TEMPORARY SOCIETY 143 (2001). 
 61. Id. at 144. 
 62. See Julian V. Roberts & Anthony N. Doob, News Media Influences on Public Views 
of Sentencing, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 451, 459 (1990).  Respondents were assigned one of 
three actual Toronto newspaper articles covering the sentencing phase of a manslaughter 
trial.  They were asked whether the sentencing judge appropriately considered all relevant 
factors and to rate the relevant importance of several sentencing aims. 
 63. See id. (noting that those reading the tabloid were more likely to state that the judge 
had not given weight to all relevant factors).  Unlike agenda-setting effects, which appear to 
be based primarily on sheer quantity of exposure, see Lowry et al., supra note 14, at 71, 
more specific perceptions of crime may be shaped by the content or presentation of media. 
 64. See Roberts & Doob, supra note 62, at 460. 
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a wide margin.65  The researchers concluded that most dissatisfaction with 
sentencing in the sample population66 was the product of misinformation 
by the news media.67 
Perceptions of recidivism rates also seem to be influenced by the media.  
While there does not appear to be any empirical research on the frequency 
with which a suspect’s parole status is reported in news accounts of crime, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that detailed information about the suspect’s 
record is often provided.  Breaches of parole are themselves deemed 
newsworthy.  Consider a 2008 article in the Toronto Star, a Toronto-based 
newspaper, about the sentencing of a defendant for aggravated assault and 
weapons offenses arising out of a stabbing at a crack house.68  The article 
not only mentions that the defendant was on parole for a life sentence of 
murder at the time of the stabbing offense, but also notes that “[m]onths be-
fore, despite three breaches of parole, he was paroled again when an expert 
deemed him manageable in the community.”69  The sentence immediately 
following renders the expert assessment absurd: “[The defendant] admitted 
that had his own finger not been in the way of the knife as he cut [his vic-
tim’s] throat, he could have killed the man.”70  The provision of lurid de-
tails like this one is a powerful, though implicit, criticism of the parole sys-
tem in a supposedly objective news piece. 
The parole status of the prime suspect in the murders of former Ameri-
can Idol contestant Jennifer Hudson’s mother, brother, and nephew re-
ceived similar scrutiny.71  In that case, the suspect was not only on parole, 
but had already breached the terms of his probation by being found in pos-
 
 65. Id. at 462.  While sixty-three percent in the newspaper article sample believed the 
twenty-one month sentence imposed was too lenient, only nineteen percent of the court doc-
uments sample felt similarly. Id.  In fact, the actual sentence of twenty-one months was rela-
tively severe for the commissioned offense: assault causing bodily harm. Id. at 461.  Moreo-
ver, seventy-six percent of the newspaper sample and thirty-six percent of the court 
documents sample believed the offender was “worse than average” in respect to the crime 
committed. Id. at 462. 
 66. In Canada at the time of the study, about eighty percent of the public (and seventy-
nine percent of survey respondents) believed sentencing was too lenient. Id. 
 67. Id. at 466. 
 68. Peter Small, On Parole at Time of Stabbing, Man Jailed 8 Years, THESTAR.COM 
(Jan. 22, 2008), http://www.thestar.com/GTA/Crime/article/296319. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Because of Hudson’s fame, the article was widely reported by entertainment media 
outlets as well as traditional news sources. See, e.g., Kate Stroup, Hudson Suspect was Out 
on Parole—Despite Drug Bust, PEOPLE, Oct. 29, 2008, http://www.people.com/people/ 
article/0,,20236443,00.html. 
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session of crack.72  One article noted he could have returned to jail on the 
basis of this earlier transgression.73 
The political ramifications of this kind of reporting are currently visible 
in Illinois, where changes to parole laws can be traced to news reports of a 
single incident.  In 2008, when Glenford Martinez killed his girlfriend and 
himself while paroled for murder, much was made of the fact that his pa-
role had not been revoked despite his arrest for battery of the same victim 
some months earlier.  A Chicago Tribune article used the incident to focus 
attention on the extent of discretion provided parole officers and the often 
“tenuous communication system between prosecutors and parole offic-
ers.”74  It also credited its own reporting to the announcement by the state’s 
Attorney General office that it would be seeking legislation to increase the 
number of offenses that mandate automatic revocation of probation.75  The 
former law only addressed felonies committed with a firearm or knife and 
failure to comply with the state’s Sex Offender Registration Act.76  The 
law, as amended in 2010, mandates automatic arrest for parolees charged 
with domestic violence.77  The specificity of the change is a powerful tes-
tament to the effects of media attention. 
B. Understanding the Theories Underlying Media Influence 
There has been a fair amount of research devoted to social psychology 
and empirical analyses of the media’s influence on public perceptions of 
crime.78  These studies often suggest that exposure to media reports of 
 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. Angela Rozas & Mary Owen, Murder Exposes Flaws in Parole System: Months Af-
ter Arrest for Battery, Parolee Kills Ex-Girlfriend, Self, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 11, 2008, http:// 
www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-domestic-violence-080411,0,3118283.story. 
 75. See id. (“[F]ollowing a story by the Tribune about the case, the Illinois attorney gen-
eral’s office said it would push for a new law to make an arrest for domestic battery, as well 
as five other new offenses, a cause to revoke parole automatically.”). 
 76. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-14-2 (section 3-14-2 of the Unified Code of Cor-
rections). 
 77. See Ill. Pub. Act 096-0282 (effective Jan. 1, 2010), available at http://www.ilga.gov/ 
legislation/publicacts/fulltext.asp?Name=096-0282. 
 78. See generally STUART HALL, REPRESENTATION: CULTURAL REPRESENTATIONS AND 
SIGNIFYING PRACTICES (1997); HOWARD KURTZ, MEDIA CIRCUS (1993); Peter Dahlgren, 
What’s the Meaning of This?: Viewers’ Plural Sense-Making of TV News, 10 MEDIA, CUL-
TURE & SOC’Y 285 (1988); Anthony N. Doob & Glenn E. McDonald, Television Viewing 
and Fear of Victimization: Is the Relationship Causal?, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY-
CHOL. 170 (1979); Eschholz, supra note 31; Gilliam, Jr. et al., supra note 29; Robert P. 
Hawkins & Suzanne Pingree, Using Television to Construct Social Reality, 25 J. BROAD-
CASTING 347 (1981); Robert P. Hawkins & Suzanne Pingree, Uniform Messages and Habi-
tual Viewing: Unnecessary Assumptions in Social Reality Effects, 7 HUM. COMM. RES. 291 
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crime increases the salience of the crime problem, focusing either on its 
importance to the public and/or public fear of crime victimization.79  No 
consensus exists among researchers regarding the precise mechanism (or 
mechanisms) that leads to these effects.  One commentator suggests that 
“no single aspect of the media shapes public opinion and, conversely, the 
media do not simply reflect prevailing trends.”80  The relationship seems to 
be both shared and interactive. 
There are a variety of factors that determine and shape public opinion of 
crime.81  However, social psychologists do not agree on the extent to which 
media exposure is relevant.  There are a number of theories which include: 
(1) cultivation theory, which posits that large amounts of media exposure 
can distort perceptions of reality,82 causing the public to overestimate and 
fear crime;83 (2) social network theory, which instead emphasizes the influ-
ence of personal experiences or the experiences of those in one’s social 
network;84 and (3) the social comparison hypothesis, which argues individ-
uals make judgments about the crime problem by comparing their own 
neighborhoods to others’.85 
1. Cultivation Theory 
Cultivation theory, an influential approach to media and communication 
research, predicts that “[w]atching a great deal of television will be asso-
ciated with a tendency to hold specific and distinct conceptions of reality, 
conceptions that are congruent with the most consistent and pervasive im-
ages and values of the medium.”86  In the view of George Gerbner, who 
 
(1981); Mary Beth Oliver, Influences of Authoritarianism and Portrayals of Race on Cau-
casian Viewers’ Responses to Reality-Based Crime Dramas, 9 COMM. REPS. 141 (1996); 
Mary Beth Oliver, Portrayals of Crime, Race, and Aggression in ‘Reality-Based’ Police 
Shows: A Content Analysis, 38 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 179 (1994); W. 
James Potter & Ik Chin Chang, Television Exposure Measures and the Cultivation Hypothe-
sis, 34 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 313 (1990); Joseph F. Sheley & Cindy D. 
Ashkins, Crime, Crime News and Crime Views, 45 PUB. OPINION Q. 492 (1981); Dan Slater 
& William R. Elliot, Television’s Influence on Social Reality, 68 Q. J. SPEECH 69 (1982). 
 79. See Linda Heath & John Petraitis, Television Viewing and Fear of Crime: Where is 
the Mean World?, 8 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 97, 97 (1987). 
 80. Sharon Casey & Philip Mohr, Law-and-Order Politics, Public-Opinion Polls and 
the Media, 12 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & LAW 141, 147 (2005). 
 81. See id. 
 82. See Kimberlianne Podlas, “The CSI Effect”: Exposing the Media Myth, 16 FORD-
HAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 429, 447-48 (2006). 
 83. See Gross & Aday, supra note 20. 
 84. See Romer et al., supra note 21, at 89-91 (discussing competing theories). 
 85. Id. 
 86. JAMES SHANAHAN & MICHAEL MORGAN, TELEVISION AND ITS VIEWERS: CULTIVA-
TION THEORY AND RESEARCH 3 (1999). 
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developed the theory in the 1970s in connection with his research on vio-
lent programming,87 television viewership serves a social unification func-
tion not unlike that of religion in earlier periods.88  Its “mainstreaming” ef-
fects help to minimize differences in reception associated with regional, 
political, socioeconomic, or cultural variance.89  In its purest form, the 
theory does not attempt to answer specific questions, but to examine the 
medium more generally to assess “the implications of stable, repetitive, 
pervasive, and virtually inescapable patterns of images and ideologies that 
television (especially dramatic, fictional entertainment) provides.”90 
Because cultivation theory is concerned chiefly with the effect of recur-
rent images and metaphors,91 the amount of television viewing among res-
pondents is paramount.92  Its methods traditionally require both a “message 
system analysis” to determine the content of television programming93 and 
a survey of subjects with varied viewing habits regarding some aspect of 
social reality; those with the highest levels of exposure are predicted to 
provide a “television answer.”94  Popular subjects for research include the 
influence of violent programming and perceptions of crime rates and crime 
victimization.95 
Numerous studies have found that heavy television viewers both overes-
timate crime rates and demonstrate “mean world syndrome”—i.e., a nega-
tive, distrustful view of social reality.96  In general terms, these phenomena 
can be characterized as first-order effects and second-order effects, respec-
tively.97  The former refers to estimates of the frequency or probability of 
events, while the latter concerns “value judgments or general attitudes 
about the state of the world at large.”98  Although there is more empirical 
support for television’s first-order effects,99 interest in second-order effects 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. See George Gerbner et al., Growing up with Television: Cultivation Processes, in 
MEDIA EFFECTS, ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH, 43, 44 (Jennings Bryant & Dolf 
Zillman eds., 2002). 
 89. See id. at 51; see also Robin L. Nabi & John L. Sullivan, Does Television Viewing 
Relate to Engagement in Protective Action Against Crime? A Cultivation Analysis From a 
Theory of Reasoned Action Perspective, 28 COMM. RES. 802, 804 (2001). 
 90. SHANAHAN & MORGAN, supra note 86, at 5. 
 91. See id. at 12. 
 92. See id. at 4. 
 93. Gerbner et al., supra note 88, at 49. 
 94. See id. at 46.  That is, they provide results most aligned with the content analysis. 
 95. See Nabi & Sullivan, supra note 89. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 803. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 804. 
THOMPSON_CHRISTENSEN 4/9/2011  8:20 PM 
2011] FROM SOUND BITES TO SOUND POLICY 791 
remains high.  One study found that television viewing has a direct effect 
on perceptions of crime and intentions to take self-protective action, “inter-
vening variables,” which in turn affects perceptions of the world as a mean 
place and engagement in protective action.100 
Cultivation theory’s emphasis on net effects of media exposure recalls 
“agenda setting,” the term used to describe the media’s power in determin-
ing matters of public import.101  Other iterations of the theory incorporate 
individual characteristics.  The concept of resonance, for example, posits 
that media-created “mean world syndrome” is “amplified” by personal ex-
perience.102  Other theories, which fall under the general heading of “recep-
tion models,” question the primacy of the quantity of media exposure alto-
gether by privileging factors like selective viewing, individual program 
selections, and the means by which viewers construct meaning.103 
2. Social Network Theory 
Public perception of crime is also a common subject of study for social 
network theorists, who instead emphasize the effect of interpersonal and 
community relations.  Fear of crime, for example, has been analyzed in a 
variety of contexts, including: physical and social vulnerability associated 
with age, gender, socioeconomic status, or past experiences (“victimiza-
tion”); neighborhood drug use and crime (“social disorder”); and proximity 
to groups with different cultural practices (“subcultural diversity”).104  
There is evidence that crime perception formation has both spatial and so-
cial elements.  Two interesting illustrations: “whites’ physical proximity to 
 
 100. Id. at 814. 
 101. See SHANAHAN & MORGAN, supra note 86, at 14.  The authors characterize agenda 
setting as “the specific, day-to-day agenda of public issue salience which culture (and cul-
tural media) sets” and cultivation theory as concerned with the “more hidden and pervasive 
boundary conditions for social discourse, wherein the cultural ground rules for what exists, 
what is important, what is right and so on, are repeated (and ritualistically consumed) so of-
ten that they become invisible.” Id.  Their point seems to be that cultivation theory is more 
stable, entrenched, and long-term. See id. 
 102. Nabi & Sullivan, supra note 89. 
 103. See Gerbner et al., supra note 88, at 48. 
 104. See generally Richard R. Bennett & Jeanne M. Flavin, Determinants of Fear: The 
Effect of Cultural Setting, 11 JUST. Q. 357 (1994). 
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[b]lacks influences their perceptions of crime rates”;105 and larger, lower-
density urban ghettos are associated with increased perception of crime.106 
Social network theory neither displaces nor ignores media research in 
this area.  In one researcher’s view, “the effects of media exposure on fear 
of crime are less significant than any naive hypothesis would suggest,” be-
cause: (1) viewers’ interactions with its messages are shaped by predisposi-
tions, personal experiences, and perceptions of credibility; and (2) interper-
sonal news sources may be more powerful.107  But while viewers “put what 
is learned from the media in the context of what they learn from other 
sources” and are aware of the media’s sensationalism,108 media may still 
affect the larger public discourse, creating “consensus.”109  The content of 
media images, for example, can obscure root social causes of criminality by 
overemphasizing “traditional law-and-order responses.”110 
II.  MEDIA INFORMS PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF RACE 
In view of the rejection of the concept of “biological race” by the scien-
tific community,111 the social construction of race has become a critical fo-
cusing question for analysts and scholars.  Michael Omi and Howard Wi-
nant, early proponents of this view, explored “the process by which social, 
economic and political forces determine the content and importance of ra-
cial categories, and by which they are in turn shaped by racial mean-
ings.”112  Some believe that the social origins of race distinctions mean that 
 
 105. Michael J. Songer & Isaac Unah, The Effect of Race, Gender, and Location on Pro-
secutorial Decisions to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 58 S.C. L. REV. 161, 179 
(2006) (citing DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGRE-
GATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 241 (1993)). 
 106. See Joseph E. Kennedy, The Jena Six, Mass Incarceration, and the Remoralization 
of Civil Rights, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 477, 496 (2009) (citing WILLIAM JULIUS WIL-
SON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR 14-15 (1996)). 
 107. Vincent F. Sacco, Media Constructions of Crime, 539 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 141, 151-52 (1995).  This may be because many media accounts are depersona-
lized. See id. 
 108. Id. at 153. 
 109. Id. at 154. 
 110. Id. at 153. 
 111. See Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on 
Illusion, Fabrication and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 12 (1994) (noting genetic 
variation is primarily a matter of geography and differences within races can exceed differ-
ences between races). 
 112. Angela Onwuachi-Willig et al., Cracking the Egg: Which Came First—Stigma or 
Affirmative Action?, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1310 n.36 (2008) (quoting MICHAEL OMI & 
HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 
1980S, at 61 (1986)). 
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race is merely an illusion.113  But to deny the existence of race is to obviate 
a search for a solution to racial inequality and ignore a very real component 
of personal and community identity.114  Social construction theory instead 
recognizes that race is: (1) a product of human construction; (2) closely tied 
to gender and class distinctions; (3) subject to rapid changes in meaning; 
and (4) always relational (i.e., each race is defined by and against oth-
ers).115 
The historical development of race as it currently exists in the United 
States lends support to these observations.  Since the 1800s, “Mexican” has 
been transformed from a nationality to a race,116 and “white” from a de-
scription of Anglo-Saxons to a more inclusive definition of Europeans and 
Middle Easterners.117  Generally, races have been defined by reference to 
the majority culture, arguably as a means of exclusion from that majority.  
Indeed, “whiteness” has been defined as the absence of a racial identity.118  
“That is why, in the United States, there are scholars and black scholars, 
women and black women.”119  Nor is race merely an historical vestige; it is 
continually reinforced and redefined by contemporary social life120 and on-
going political struggle.121 
Social constructions of race—how we define race—contribute to the 
formation of racial stereotypes.  Just as a biological basis for race is losing 
steam in the academic community, “old fashioned racism”—the belief in 
the genetic or cultural inferiority of particular races—is in decline.  In its 
stead is the so-called “new racism,” marked by subtlety and the denial of 
continuing institutional discrimination.122  These attitudes and racial mi-
sunderstandings, more generally, likely flow from the fact that races tend to 
 
 113. See, e.g., Lewis M. Killian, Black Power and White Reactions: the Revitalization of 
Race Thinking in the United States, 454 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 42, 43 (1981) 
(deeming race a “pseudoscientific yet politically potent fallacy”). 
 114. See Lopez, supra note 111, at 19-20. 
 115. See id. at 28. 
 116. Id. at 30. 
 117. Id. at 34. 
 118. See id. at 10 n.36. 
 119. Barbara Jeanne Fields, Slavery, Race and Ideology in the United States of America, 
181 NEW LEFT REV. 95, 98 (1990). 
 120. Id. at 118 (“If race lives on today, it can do so only because we continue to create 
and re-create it in our social life, continue to verify it, and thus continue to need a social vo-
cabulary that will allow us to make sense, not of what our ancestors did then, but of what we 
ourselves choose to do now.”). 
 121. John O. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp and Fire Music: Securing an 
Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129, 2160 (1992). 
 122. See Gilliam, Jr. & Iyengar, supra note 47, at 566.  Additional features include be-
liefs that blacks do not work hard, make illegitimate demands, and receive undeserved gov-
ernment handouts. 
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occupy separate societies often with only limited interracial interaction.123  
Perhaps as a consequence of this separation, negative stereotypes persist in 
abstract form even in the face of contradictory (i.e., positive) personal ex-
periences.124  While express racist attitudes have become socially stigma-
tized, studies of “implicit attitudes” reveal that negative associations with 
blackness are the norm.125  These stereotypes are also self-reinforcing, as 
“people tend to remember stereotype-consistent information, remember the 
negative information in an even stronger form, and then emphasize its im-
portance.”126  As such, individual conceptions of race are strongly mediated 
by prevailing, socially mediated definitions and inferences. 
A. Media Influences Public Perception of Who Commits Crimes 
Not only is the television news coverage of crime increasingly filtered 
through a “racialized” lens, it also has had a pronounced impact on how 
America views people of color—particularly African-Americans when it 
comes to crime.  In a Washington Post article, one author noted that even 
when the racial identity of a suspect is not pictured on television or noted, 
two-thirds of those who falsely believed the suspect was shown, believed 
that he was black.127  It is important to note that even when crime is re-
ported involving African-Americans, it is most often reported as a crime of 
violence and not a property crime.  This can lead the average American to 
conclude that most black offenders are violent.128  This can, in turn, lead to 
the stereotyping of African-Americans as criminal and/or violent.129 
 
 123. See Calmore, supra note 121, at 2144 (noting the two groups “so often see quite dif-
ferent realities at both the perceptual and experiential levels”). 
 124. See id. at 2415 & n.53 (citing Arthur J. Kropp, Colleges Must Find Ways to Eradi-
cate Racial Division, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 22, 1992, at B3) (discussing a study in 
which white youths described blacks in general as welfare-dependent but their own black 
friends as hardworking). 
 125. See generally Sheri Lynn Johnson, Litigating for Racial Fairness After McCleskey 
v. Kemp, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 178 (2007).  One test that measured how long it 
takes an individual to pair black and good, and white and bad (and vice versa) demonstrated 
that eighty percent of white Americans of all educational levels show moderate or strong 
association of black with bad, regardless of their express beliefs. Id. at 191-92. 
 126. Id. at 198. 
 127. See Howard Kurtz, A Guilty Verdict on Crime, Race Bias; TV Viewers Often Assume 
Suspects are Black, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 1997, at C1 (defining the assumption whereby 
whites “automatically associate a crime story with a nonwhite guy” as an “overlearned phe-
nomenon”). 
 128. ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE AND UN-
EQUAL 181 (1992).  For an in-depth discussion on the impact of race in crime, see id. at 179-
98. 
 129. See Martin Gilens, Race and Poverty in America: Public Misperceptions and the 
American News Media, 60 PUB. OPINION Q. 515, 516, 531 (1996) (discussing stereotyping in 
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Further, the media depicts a large proportion of offenders as racial and 
ethnic minorities, even though a much smaller percentage of minorities are 
actually involved in the criminal justice system.130  A large proportion of 
victims are also white.131  Suspects who are members of racial minority 
groups are also less likely to be treated sympathetically in the news.  For 
example, black suspects are less likely to be identified by name and more 
likely to be shown physically restrained.132  Moreover, black people are 
underrepresented as victims in the news, even as they are overrepresented 
as perpetrators.  According to Gilliam and Iyengar, more than sixty percent 
of the subjects who watched a broadcast that included no perpetrator falsely 
recalled having seen one and seventy percent of those who remembered 
seeing one identified the perpetrator as black.133  In this way, the media ap-
pears to “influence public attitudes about criminal justice policies by instil-
ling and reinforcing racial stereotypes and linking race to crime.”134 
Crime coverage is one of the major influences on criminal justice policy 
agenda-setting.  In addition to frequency and scope of coverage, the media 
also serves other more subtle roles in its influence over the public’s percep-
tions about crime.  One way it does so is through “priming” popular per-
ceptions by the weight of coverage attached to an issue.135  Another way in 
which the media contributes to confusion about frequency of crime is over-
reporting violent crime and overemphasizing the role of minority perpetra-
tors in the commission of violent crime.136 
 
context of perceptions of poverty); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-
Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1081 (1991) (noting that when whites come in 
contact with a black person who defies their stereotypes, they pay her a compliment by stat-
ing that the person is not viewed any longer as black); Marlene Cimons, Myths Color Views 
on Who Receives Aid, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 29, 1995, at 24 (opining that most Americans 
believe that the average Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) recipient is a 
black female when in reality it is a rural white person). 
 130. See, e.g., Beale, supra note 12, at 459. 
 131. See id. 
 132. Id. at 459-60. 
 133. Gilliam, Jr. & Iyengar, supra note 47, at 564. 
 134. Beale, supra note 12, at 402. 
 135. The “priming” effect of this “standard crime script” is so powerful that in video ex-
periments which made no reference to a perpetrator, sixty percent of respondents erroneous-
ly recalled seeing a perpetrator and in seventy percent of those cases, they identified the 
perpetrator as black. See Gilliam, Jr. & Iyengar, supra note 47, at 564. 
 136. Gilliam, Jr. et al., supra note 29, at 8; see also Dorfman & Schiraldi, supra note 36. 
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1. Over-Reporting Crime Frequency in Eras of Declining Crime 
The exaggerating effects of the media’s coverage of the crime problem 
are often addressed by media law commentators.137  The paradox of the 
 
 137. See e.g., Lopez, supra note 111, at 6-7, 11-17.  Lopez begins by discrediting histori-
cal and contemporary theories of race: the biological perspective has been disproved by evi-
dence that shared morphological characteristics, such as skin color and hair texture, belie 
significant genetic variation. Id. at 12.  Ethnicity theory erroneously composites a heteroge-
neous group of people, while ignoring larger social and political institutions that reinforce 
racism. Id. at 17.  And nationalist and colonialist theories oversimplify racial phenomena 
and ignore differences in social attainment within races. Id. at 26-27.  Lopez’s alternative, a 
“racial fabrication theory,” argues that races are “historically contingent, socially mediated 
systems of meaning that attach to elements of an individual’s morphology and ancestry.” Id. 
at 38-39.  On an individual level, race is a product of chance (ancestry and morphology), 
context (historical and social), and choice (conscious and/or coerced). See id. at 62. 
  See e.g., Meares & Kahan, supra note 50.  The authors argue that three forms of 
“social norms of disorder” contribute to high crime rates in inner cities: (1) a lack of positive 
“social organization” (e.g., supervision of children, participation in community groups, and 
strong neighborhood ties); (2) the perception of disorder produced by past crime rates and 
crime fads (“social influence”); and (3) the “social meaning” attached to a decision to 
obey—or break—the law. See id. at 806, 811, 814-15, 821.  By addressing these perceptions 
of the commonality of crime, law enforcement policies like curfews and loitering ordinances 
can reduce crime more effectively than harsh, deterrent approaches. See id. at 821. 
  See e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman & Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Illegal Fictions: Mystery 
Novels and the Popular Image of Crime, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1411 (2001).  The authors 
trace the relationship between detective stories, public opinion, and the law. Id. at 1430.  
Recent incarnations of the genre depict crime as random and sociopathic rather than rational 
and deliberate. Id. at 1427.  As such, contemporary detective fiction, along with rising crime 
rates, news media, and television dramas, contribute to a “culture of fear” that increases 
support for punitive criminal justice policies. Id. at 1428. 
  See e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and The Social Meaning 
of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775 (1999).  Roberts ex-
amines constitutionally vague loitering statutes to critique order maintenance policing 
backed by social norm theory.  The idea that a breakdown of order contributes to crime rates 
relies on questionable empirical support and the flawed premise that police can distinguish 
between law abiders and law breakers in the absence of an underlying crime. See id. at 799, 
803.  Moreover, these law enforcement strategies receive mixed support in black communi-
ties and increase presumptions of black criminality. See id. at 806, 808. 
  See, e.g., Gilliam, Jr. et al., supra note 29.  Statistical analysis of local news report-
ing revealed that both violent crime (particularly murder) and nonwhite crime are overrepre-
sented.  Moreover, racial cues in crime stories contribute to fear of crime by activating racial 
stereotypes. See id. at 8. 
  See e.g., Gilliam, Jr. & Iyengar, supra note 47.  Familiar scenarios in local news sto-
ries “generate[] strong expectations about crime, allowing viewers to fill in gaps in the 
script.” Id. at 564.  These narrative “scripts” suggest that crime is violent and nonwhite.  Ra-
cialized reporting in particular is associated with increased support for punitive policies 
(e.g., the death penalty and mandatory sentences) and, among white viewers, negative ste-
reotypes about blacks. See id. at 560-61. 
  See e.g., Brito, supra note 30.  The author examines how media scrutiny of crimes 
perpetrated against children intensifies and distorts parents’ fears.  Daycare sexual abuse 
scandals of the 1980s, pedophilia and child abduction cases of the 1990s, and more recent 
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decade of the 1990s—an increase in public concern about crime in an era 
of falling crime rates—is frequently cited as evidence of the distortive 
power of television news coverage.138  A recent case study of three Ameri-
can cities by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency provides spe-
cific support for this and similar assumptions of exaggeration by the news 
media.139  The study compared two decades worth of local news reports to 
actual crime trends in Washington, D.C., Dallas, Texas, and San Mateo, 
California to examine the media’s portrayal of juvenile justice issues.140  It 
found little correlation between trends in news media reporting and actual 
crime rates. 
Consider two illustrations: Reports of a “juvenile crime wave” in Wash-
ington, D.C. in 2002 persisted though the increase in proportion of total ju-
venile arrests was less than one percent and overall crime rates had de-
creased by half within the previous decade;141 Dallas newspapers 
emphasized a rise in specific crimes and criticized the city police for a fail-
ure to meet crime reduction goals, despite a thirty percent decrease in vio-
lent crime reports between 1995 and 2007.142  These examples suggest two 
mechanisms by which news media may fabricate perceptions of a “crime 
problem”: extrapolating larger crime trends from isolated incidents, and se-
lectively reporting rises in particular crimes.  These forms of editorializing 
can be reduced to the same error that many of their consumers—legislators 
and constituents alike—fall prey to: overgeneralization.143 
2. Public Perception of Race Exacerbates Crime Issue 
Social conceptions of race intersect public perceptions of crime through 
the operation of stereotypes about people of color.  General presumptions 
about black criminality, reinforced by law enforcement strategies144 and 
 
mass murders at public schools are examples of “phantom menaces,” dangers grossly exag-
gerated by persistent news coverage. Id. at 520. 
 138. See, e.g., Lowry et al., supra note 14, at 62 (notwithstanding increased salience of 
crime, the national crime rate index in the 1990s increased at a slower rate than the popula-
tion). 
 139. See Youth Violence Myths and Realities: A Tale of Three Cities: Hearing on Youth 
Violence: Trends, Myths, and Solutions Before the H. Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism & 
Homeland Security, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Dr. Barry Krisberg, Pres., Nat’l 
Council Crime & Delinquency), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/ 
Krisberg090211.pdf. 
 140. Id. at 2. 
 141. Id. at 7. 
 142. Id. at 8. 
 143. JULIAN V. ROBERTS & MIKE HOUGH, UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE 11 (2005). 
 144. See Roberts, supra note 137, at 808. 
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disproportionate African-American populations within prisons,145 racialize 
the public’s perception of crime.  Empirical studies have confirmed that ra-
cial cues are exceptionally powerful: public fears about crime are triggered 
more by minority offenders in particular than by violent crimes generally in 
local news coverage.146  Similarly, “the news tends to exaggerate existing 
racial differences in actual crime rates by disproportionately depicting 
blacks in the role of violent perpetrators and whites as nonviolent perpetra-
tors . . . .  In effect, the news depicts crime in ‘black and white.’”147  Preex-
isting racial stereotypes, “primed” by the media,148 are continually con-
firmed and applied in new contexts.149 
Perceptions of black criminality have some basis in crime and incarcera-
tion rates.  However, the interaction between socially mediated construc-
tions of race, negative racial associations, and mechanisms for the forma-
tion of public conceptions of crime does not merely mirror the underlying 
problem—it distorts and perpetuates it.  Arguably, the war on drugs is 
largely responsible for the high incarceration rates of minorities, at least 
one study illustrates that those rates are not due to increased criminality.  
Taking the war on drugs in New York for example, during the period be-
ginning in 1980 and ending in 1997, there was a 93% increase in drug of-
fenses for whites, and 1615% and 1311% increases for Latinos and Afri-
can-Americans respectively.150  In addition, although blacks constitute 
approximately 13% of the U.S. population and 13% of its drug users; Afri-
can-Americans constitute 35% of drug arrests, 55% of drug convictions, 
and 74% of drug imprisonments.151  This speaks to the effects of discretion 
in the criminal justice system and how that discretion impacts people of 
color generally and African-Americans in particular. 
These mechanisms have important policy implications.  Racialized news 
reporting has been associated with increased support for harsh punishments 
 
 145. See Meares & Kahan, supra note 50, at 818 (“Like segregated ghettoes, prisons in 
which half of the inmates are African Americans help to forge an African American identity 
that ‘color codes’ to crime and that is separated from the ‘mainstream’ American identity.”). 
 146. See Gilliam, Jr. et al., supra note 29. 
 147. Id. at 15. 
 148. Id. at 8. 
 149. Consider Gilliam and Iyengar’s discussion of the employment of narrative scripts as 
gap-fillers. See generally Gilliam, Jr. & Iyengar, supra note 47. 
 150. ROBERT GANGI ET AL., JUST. POL’Y INST., NEW YORK STATE OF MIND?: HIGHER EDU-
CATION VS. PRISON FUNDING IN THE EMPIRE STATE, 1988-1998, at 4 (1998), available at 
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/jpi/nysom.pdf. 
 151. Ira Glasser, American Drug Laws: The New Jim Crow, 63 ALB. L. REV. 703, 719 
(2000) (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 14 
(1999)). 
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like the death penalty and mandatory sentencing.152  Commentators have 
noted that these tough-on-crime initiatives further disrupt already suscepti-
ble inner-city communities, reinforcing social norms of disorder and law-
lessness.153  It is also important to note that the law enforcement officials 
charged with maintaining order are not immune from the effects of racial 
stereotyping.  Indeed, the evidence suggests blacks are subject to dispro-
portionate arrest, often related to traffic stops and drug offenses.154 
Researchers have shown that the growth in disproportionate incarcera-
tion rates for people of color in the last two decades are not easily ex-
plained by higher rates of crime commission.155  Noted criminologist Bruce 
Western for example, explains the growth in imprisonment as related to 
significant increases (for African-American men) in the use of imprison-
ment for those convicted of crime, increases in the length of sentences, and 
increases in the prosecution and incarceration of drug offenders.156  West-
ern concludes that “[p]oor and minority men were much less involved in 
crime in 2000 than twenty years earlier, matching declines in crime in the 
population as a whole.”157  “Although disadvantaged men became much 
more law-abiding, their chances of going to prison rose to historically high 
levels.”158 
B. Politicians Capitalize on Timing and Media Focus 
Major events generate “policy windows” that enable advocates to ad-
vance their agendas or to focus public attention on particular issues or 
trends that advocates consider special problems.159  Some politicians op-
portunistically latch onto particular issues or events to which they can at-
tach their legislative agendas.  Others simply wait for the inevitable mo-
ment when their pet problem will manifest so that they might knowingly 
emerge ready and willing to use the media to instigate public debate or 
more often launch a personal diatribe.160  Media coverage of those events 
 
 152. Gilliam, Jr. & Iyengar, supra note 47, at 561. 
 153. See Meares & Kahan, supra note 50, at 813. 
 154. See Roberts, supra note 137, at 808. 
 155. See BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY 50 (2006) (documenting incar-
ceration percentages in 2000 for men aged twenty to forty). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See Steven Chermak & Alexander Weiss, The Effects of the Media on Federal Crim-
inal Justice Policy, 8 CRIM. J. POL’Y REV. 323, 324-25 (1997) (citing JOHN W. KINGDON, 
AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (2d ed. 1997)). 
 160. Id. 
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facilitates the advocates’ use of the event and ultimately shapes how the 
constituencies to which they respond conceptualize these events. 
1. A Closer Look at Legislation 
Megan’s Law is a prime example.  In 1994, seven-year-old Megan Kan-
ka was abducted, raped, and killed by Jesse Timmendequas.161  Timmen-
dequas lived in a home across the street from Megan and one morning Me-
gan reportedly knocked on Timmendequas’ front door and asked to see the 
puppy he had just acquired.  He invited her in and she never walked out.  
Timmendequas had been convicted twice before for sex offenses, and he 
lived in a house with two other convicted sex offenders.  The Kanka family 
asserted that they had been unaware of Timmendequas’ criminal history al-
though the majority of their neighbors were at least aware of the criminal 
history of one of Timmendequas’ roommates.  The public revelation of 
Timmendequas’ history of sex offenses provoked heated reactions from 
residents of the quiet suburban township in which the offense occurred.162  
More than one thousand people turned out for a vigil in a local park. 
The fury spread nationally.  Megan’s parents became actively involved 
in taking steps to ensure that justice would be done in Megan’s case and 
that the tragedy they had endured would not be repeated.163  Their efforts 
had tremendous public appeal because they were able to tap into fears 
about the safety of children particularly given the perceived threat that for-
mer sex offenders could be “hiding” in our midst.164  The Kanka family 
launched the Megan Nicole Kanka Foundation, founded on the belief that 
“every parent should have the right to know if a dangerous sexual predator 
moves into their neighborhood.”165  They circulated a petition to enact leg-
islation that would ensure notification that sex offenders were residing in 
the area and obtained hundreds of thousands of signatures in support.166  
The New Jersey state legislature responded to public pressure by enacting a 
hastily prepared package of nine sex offender statutes that have come to be 
known collectively as “Megan’s Law.”  The legislature passed Megan’s 
 
 161. See, e.g., Robert Hanley, Man Convicted of Killing Megan Kanka Asks for New Tri-
al, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/02/nyregion/man-convicted 
-of-killing-megan-kanka-asks-for-a-new-trial.html?ref=megankanka. 
 162. See LARRY J. SIEGEL, INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 157 (12th ed. 2010). 
 163. See, e.g., MEGAN KANKA FOUNDATION, http://www.megannicolekankafoundation. 
org/mission.htm (organization founded by the Kanka family “to ensure that every possible 
step is taken to help prevent the future victimization of children”). 
 164. See, e.g., SIEGEL, supra note 162. 
 165. See JOEL B. RUDIN, MEGAN’S LAW, ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4 (1996). 
 166. America’s Unjust Sex Laws, ECONOMIST, Aug. 6, 2009, http://www.economist.com/ 
node/14165460. 
THOMPSON_CHRISTENSEN 4/9/2011  8:20 PM 
2011] FROM SOUND BITES TO SOUND POLICY 801 
Law in less than ninety days.  Forty-one states followed New Jersey’s lead 
and passed their own versions of “Megan’s Law.” 
Any such occurrence is tragic and worthy of attention and response.  But 
in this instance, these laws were enacted without the kind of substantive 
hearings that one would ordinarily expect to test and question the efficacy 
of the proposal.  Instead, given the emotionally-charged nature of this case, 
the legislation was passed with great haste and little debate.167  As we con-
sider the events with the benefit of hindsight, we can see with clarity that 
the media coverage led to understandable public outcry.  But what followed 
was a desire to strike back, rather than the kind of thorough analysis that 
would examine and uncover the frequency of the occurrence of such of-
fenses, and explore the kinds of practices that policymakers might put in 
place that had been effective in the past.  Both the public and politicians 
simply looked for the newest, most draconian response to prove our ability 
to be tough on crime. 
Three years later, we saw a repetition of this pattern.  In November 
1997, Jenna Grieshaber lost her life violently.  She was a twenty-two-year-
old nursing student, who was six weeks away from graduation when she 
was murdered in her Albany, New York apartment by Nicholas Pryor, who 
had recently been paroled.168  The murder received considerable local at-
tention, but when Jenna’s murder spurred her parents to take action, the 
media coverage intensified.169  The Grieshabers began a public and politi-
cal crusade in New York State to end parole for anyone convicted of a vio-
lent felony.170 
Then New York Governor George Pataki took on the Grieshabers’ cause 
as part of what would become his legacy.  He made “Jenna’s Law” the fo-
cus of his 1998 State of the State Address.171  The proposed law quickly 
gained momentum, although separate versions passed in the Assembly and 
the Senate.  The Democratic controlled Assembly included provisions for 
education programs in prisons and allowed drug treatment as an alternative 
 
 167. See, e.g., Megan’s Law, 1995 N.Y. Laws ch. 192, amended by 1999 N.Y. Laws ch. 
453, and 2002 N.Y. Laws ch. 11 (creating the New York State Sex Offender Registration 
Act, which requires individuals convicted of certain offenses to register with the New York 
State Division of Criminal Justice Services and provide address information). 
 168. Evelyn Nieves, Our Towns: Lost Crusader Inspires “Jenna’s Law,” N.Y. TIMES, 
May 3, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/03/nyregion/our-towns-lost-crusader-inspir 
es-jenna-s-law.html. 
 169. See, e.g., Abby Goodnough, Debate Grows Over Efforts to End Parole, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 30, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/30/nyregion/debate-grows-over-efforts-to-
end-parole.html?src=pm. 
 170. See id. 
 171. ROBERT B. WARD, NEW YORK STATE GOVERNMENT 449 (2006). 
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to prison for nonviolent drug offenders.172  The Republican controlled Se-
nate rejected these amendments, and the regular session ended on June 19 
without passage of Jenna’s Law.173  Against quite vocal public outrage 
about the state legislature’s unwillingness to protect citizens against violent 
crime, the Speaker of the Assembly called a rare, one-day Special Session 
for the express purpose of passing the bill that had become known as “Jen-
na’s Law.”  The Assembly passed the bill on July 29 by a 128 to 20 majori-
ty. 
The media’s role in shaping prevailing perceptions of crime has policy 
implications for legislators and judges responsive to shifts in public opi-
nion.174  In a handful of cases, heavy media coverage can be linked directly 
to the introduction of legislation reacting to “public outcry for retribution of 
criminal conduct.”175  As stated above, Megan’s Law, which conditions 
states’ receipt of federal criminal justice funding on the establishment of a 
sex offender registry, is one such example.  The legislation was named for 
a seven-year-old New Jersey resident murdered by her neighbor, a con-
victed sex offender.  The murder attracted extensive media attention na-
tionwide and increased support for greater monitoring of these sexual pre-
dators.176  While express reference to specific news reports is absent from 
the legislative history, the media’s influence in disseminating stories like 
Megan’s can be gleaned from language in the House Report identifying the 
need for the legislation: 
Perhaps no type of crime has received more attention in recent years than 
crimes against children involving sexual acts and violence.  Several recent 
tragic cases have focused public attention on this type of crime and re-
sulted in public demand that government take stronger action against 
those who commit these crimes.177 
One example of treating a criminal justice policy based on media and 
politics rather than using evidence to formulate effective policy is that of 
the juvenile registration component of the Adam Walsh Child Protection 
 
 172. See Thomas F. Liotti, 1997-98 Survey: Penal Law, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 665, 667 
(1999). 
 173. See id. 
 174. See Roberts & Doob, supra note 62, at 454. 
 175. Ellen S. Podgor, The Challenge of White Collar Sentencing, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 731, 743-44 (2007) (citing Megan’s Law, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the Patriot 
Act as examples). 
 176. See Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan’s Law: A Study in Legislative Rhe-
toric, 76 INDIANA L.J. 315, 315 n.3 (2001).  The author conducted a search of the LexisNex-
is news database, revealing sixty-four articles in twenty-one newspapers within nine days of 
the arrest of Megan’s murderer. Id.  He predicted this figure was grossly underestimated. Id. 
 177. H.R. REP. NO. 104-555, at 2 (1996). 
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and Safety Act (AWA) and its requirement that some juvenile adjudica-
tions be treated as “convictions” requiring registration.178  Unlike many 
federal community notification laws that focus only on adult offenders, the 
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) expressly ap-
plies to both juvenile and adult offenders.179  The application of community 
notification to juvenile offenders appears to run counter to evidence that 
suggests the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system.180  Moreo-
ver, the registration requirement of juvenile sex offenders may have a nega-
tive impact on the normal development of adolescents and children, and is 
contrary to parens patriae juvenile justice.181 
Unilaterally including all offenders fourteen years of age or older at the 
time of the offense, in essence, makes no distinction in the type of of-
fense.182  Some experts have noted that charges included in some states’ 
sex offense statutes provide wide discretion.  From acts including public 
urination and non-forcible conduct to violent sexual assault.183  Some cases 
involve serious treatable conduct while others simply involve any person 
who has not yet reached the age of majority while being adjudicated delin-
quent from committing a sexual act.184  The juvenile sex offender popula-
 
 178. Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. § 16911(8) (2006) (“The 
term ‘convicted’ or a variant thereof, used with respect to a sex offense, includes adjudi-
cated delinquent as a juvenile for that offense, but only if the offender is 14 years of age or 
older at the time of the offense and the offense adjudicated was comparable to or more se-
vere than aggravated sexual abuse . . . or was an attempt or conspiracy to commit such an 
offense.”). 
 179. Compare id., with Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
14071(a)(3)(A) (2006) (“[C]onduct which is criminal only because of the age of the victim 
shall not be considered a criminal offense if the perpetrator is 18 years of age or younger.”). 
 180. Timothy E. Wind, The Quandary of Megan’s Law: When the Child Sex Offender is a 
Child, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 73, 116 (2003) (“Applying the requirements of Megan’s 
Laws to adolescent sex offenders may have a negative impact on the normal development of 
the youthful offender.  This is contrary to the fundamental underpinnings of the juvenile jus-
tice system . . . .”). 
 181. Freeman-Longo, supra note 57, at 231.  “Public notification may be considered a 
form of punishment,” and is therefore contrary to rehabilitative juvenile justice. Id. at 227. 
 182. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AN AMERICAN TRAVESTY: LEGAL RESPONSES TO ADO-
LESCENT SEXUAL OFFENDING (2004) (describing New Jersey case where a ten-year-old boy 
was adjudicated delinquent of second degree sexual assault against his eight-year-old cou-
sin, classified as a moderate-risk sex offender, and required to provide formal notification to 
all schools within a two-mile radius). 
 183. SARAH TOFTE, NO EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE U.S. 5-9 (Jaime 
Fellner ed., 2007), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/us0907/us0907web.pdf. 
 184. See Ayn Embar-Seddon, Assessing, Managing, and Treating Juvenile Sexual Of-
fenders, 2004 J. INST. JUST. INT’L STUD. 112, 113. 
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tion is diverse in both age and type of offense.185  Studies suggest that ju-
venile sex offenders are overwhelmingly male.186 
Both the media and policy-makers supporting juvenile registration often 
suggest that juvenile sex offenders are likely to re-offend in the same man-
ner and frequency as adult offenders,187 while the preliminary evidence 
supports the opposite conclusion.188  In addition to being less likely to re-
offend, juvenile sex offenders are less likely to engage in the most serious 
of sex offenses and rarely fit the criteria of the legal definition of pedo-
phile.189  Finally, unlike their adult counterparts, juveniles adjudicated as 
sex offenders are much more responsive to treatment.190 
Despite the sparse quantity of data on juvenile sex offender treatment, 
experts have suggested rationales for juveniles being especially responsive 
to treatment.  One explanation is that juvenile conduct is often a result of 
normal juvenile experimentation191 as opposed to deeply engrained adult 
pathology.192 
The rationale behind sex offender registration and community notifica-
tion is based largely on the notion that individuals convicted of sex of-
fenses engage in behavior that is not responsive to treatment and therefore 
need to be publicly identified.193  This justification is less applicable to ju-
veniles given their less predatory behavior and susceptibility to effective 
treatment.194  Since juvenile sex offenders are less likely to recidivate and 
are more susceptible to treatment, the conventional rationales for registra-
 
 185. NCSBY: NAT’L CTR. ON SEXUAL BEHAVIOR OF YOUTH, http://www.ncsby.org/ (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2011) (information gathered and assessed by the University of Oklahoma 
Health Sciences Center). 
 186. Victor I. Vieth, When the Child Abuser Is a Child: Investigating, Prosecuting and 
Treating Juvenile Sex Offenders in the New Millennium, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 47, 50 (2001). 
 187. See generally Alexis O. Miranda & Colette L. Corcoran, Comparison of Perpetra-
tion Characteristics Between Male Juvenile and Adult Sexual Offenders: Preliminary Re-
sults, 12 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 179 (2000). 
 188. Margaret A. Alexander, Sexual Offender Treatment Efficacy Revisited, 11 SEXUAL 
ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 2 (1999), available at http://www.helping-people.info/articles/ 
alexander.htm. 
 189. See NCSBY, supra note 185.  A pedophile is an individual who fantasizes about, is 
sexually aroused by, or experiences sexual urges toward prepubescents for a period of at 
least six months. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-IV-TR (4th ed. 2000). 
 190. See NCSBY, supra note 185; see also Lisa C. Trivits & N. Dickon Reppucci, Appli-
cation of Megan’s Laws to Juveniles, 57 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 690, 697-98 (2002). 
 191. Trivits & Reppucci, supra note 190, at 696. 
 192. See Embar-Seddon, supra note 184, at 114. 
 193. See ERIC S. JANUS, AMERICA’S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS AND THE RISE OF THE PRE-
VENTATIVE STATE 54-58 (2006). 
 194. See Robert E. Shepherd, Advocating for the Juvenile Sex Offender, Part 1, 21 CRIM. 
JUST. 53, 54 (2006). 
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tion and community notification do not seem applicable.  Moreover, Elliott 
Currie, in his seminal work Crime and Punishment in America, suggests 
that registration schemes may actually hinder and not help the rehabilita-
tion of juvenile offenders.195 
The name of the act itself, the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety 
Act (AWA), suggests that the intent of the authors of the legislation was to 
play to the public’s fear for the safety of children (in naming the act for an 
abducted child).196  The process of naming legislation after victimized 
children creates a political dichotomy that would position opponents as ap-
pearing to be less than vigilant in the protection of children.197  Notwith-
standing the lack of evidentiary support for registration and notification at 
the time of the passage of AWA, and the fact that there were no published 
studies concluding that “publicly accessible sex offender registers will have 
any beneficial effect on reducing sex crimes,”198 those provisions remained 
in the final draft of the legislation.  The twin combination of registration 
and public disclosure of those juveniles adjudicated as sex offenders con-
tradicts both the protections of minors in juvenile courts as well as the pri-
mary aim of rehabilitation of juvenile offenders.199 
The media’s role in the shaping of legislation includes the focus of sto-
ries as well as the absence of information substantiating the frequency with 
which the incidents occur.  Although the bulk of offenses against children 
are committed by someone the child knows, the media’s spotlight focuses 
primarily on accounts of stranger rapes and murders. 
One of the results of ignoring the data and following the political and 
media rhetoric is legislation like the juvenile registration and community 
notification provisions of AWA.  The rationale of giving sex offender reg-
istration information to the public is to better protect the public from dan-
gerous sex offenders.200  Arguably, to protect the public, notification is ne-
cessary for juvenile offenders when there is some evidence such as threats 
 
 195. See generally ELLIOTT CURRIE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1998). 
 196. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H5725 (daily ed. July 25, 2006) (statement of Rep. Fo-
ley); 152 CONG. REC. H5726 (daily ed. July 25, 2006) (statement of Rep. Cramer). 
 197. See Elizabeth Garfinkle, Comment, Coming of Age in America: The Misapplication 
of Sex-Offender Registration and Community Notification Laws to Juveniles, 91 CALIF. L. 
REV. 163, 174 (2003). 
 198. 152 CONG. REC. H5724 (daily ed. July 25, 2006) (statement of Rep. Scott). 
 199. See, e.g., Lisa A. Stanger, Note, Conflicts Between Attorneys and Social Workers 
Representing Children in Delinquency Proceedings, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1123, 1127 
(1996). 
 200. See CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION: POLICY OVER-
VIEW AND COMPREHENSIVE PRACTICES 1-2 (1999), available at http://www.csom.org/pubs/ 
sexreg.pdf; see also Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. § 16901 
(2006). 
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of force or violence with the victims, high-risk assessment, or lack of res-
ponsiveness to treatment.201  However, in other instances, registration and 
community notification may result in emotional responses that impede 
treatment.202 
Because it is unclear that community notification is appropriate in all 
situations in which juveniles are adjudicated delinquent of sexual of-
fenses,203 and for juveniles who, for example, engage in consensual sexual 
acts with perceived peers who are under the age of twelve as a result of 
newly-found sexual impulses, community notification would likely not be 
the appropriate course of action.204  Juveniles engaged in the previously de-
scribed behavior need treatment and support—it is not necessarily the case 
that mandatory community notification will benefit the public and the ju-
venile offender.205 
2. “Tough on Crime” Political Stance is Fueled by Media and Fear 
National and political divisions about race enabled conservative Repub-
lican politicians to advocate particular crime and welfare policies for elec-
toral advantage.  During this period, news media coverage put a black face 
on crime, and political campaigns to get “tough on crime” and on youth vi-
olence turned juveniles into symbols of race and crime.206 
Politicians use gory and sensationalist stories to avoid real debate, and to 
attract attention.  One commentator has argued that the repeated use of 
these well-publicized stories by legislator-debaters is an important rhetori-
cal device.207  For federal legislators debating Megan’s Law and New York 
 
 201. Robert E. Longo & Martin C. Calder, The Use of Sex Offender Registration With 
Young People Who Sexually Abuse, in CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE WHO SEXUALLY 
ABUSE 334, 350-51 (Martin C. Calder ed., 2005). 
 202. See Kristin Henning, Eroding Confidentiality in Delinquency Proceedings: Should 
Schools and Public Housing Authorities Be Notified?, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 541 (2004) 
(“Adolescents not only respond well to the positive influences of rehabilitation, but they al-
so respond poorly to the negative influences of mistreatment and perceived injustice.”). 
 203. Longo & Calder, supra note 201, at 343. 
 204. See Suzanne Meiners-Levy, Challenging the Prosecution of Young “Sex Offend-
ers”: How Developmental Psychology and the Lessons of Roper Should Inform Daily Prac-
tice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 499, 506 (2006). 
 205. See Longo & Calder, supra note 201, at 349; Garfinkle, supra note 197, at 198 
(“[C]ommunity-notification requirements for children’s and adolescents’ sex crimes can 
significantly hinder these young people’s potential to grow up and out of their criminal be-
havior.”). 
 206. See KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, DIRTY POLITICS: DECEPTION, DISTRACTION, AND 
DEMOCRACY 144 (1992); TALI MENDELBERG, THE RACE CARD: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY, IM-
PLICIT MESSAGES, AND THE NORM OF EQUALITY 135-65 (2001). 
 207. Filler, supra note 176, at 330. 
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representatives debating related legislation,208 “the citation and description 
of individual cases of child abduction, sexual abuse, and murder” that had 
received national media coverage dominated normative discussion of the 
justification for the registry.209  Reliance on these stories “proved that legis-
lators watched the same gory news coverage as everyone else.”210  Thus, 
the legislators helped to further engrain media-intensive stories onto the 
public consciousness.211  Like media accounts themselves, proponents of 
criminal statutes are prone to exaggerations and omissions.  Throughout the 
discussion of Megan’s Law, the glut of anecdotal evidence of the threat 
posed by sex offenders obscured some potential objections to the legisla-
tion, including its harmful effects on less culpable offenders212 and its fail-
ure to address sexual abuse within the home. 
New policies, programs, and tactics respond to issues that are “hot” in 
the media at that moment.  While direct evidence of a legislative response 
to news reports is hard to come by, the media also shapes public policy in-
directly, further expanding its influence.  For example, studies show that 
news coverage of gangs in the 1990s led to the creation of a special task 
force that in turn increased prosecution.213  When a shift in news trend di-
verted attention to other matters, the program was abandoned.  When gang 
activity inevitably increased, the media once again began covering the 
problem and the programs were reinstated.214  Presumably, this kind of res-
ponsiveness by policymakers to areas emphasized by the news is rooted in 
a belief that perceptions propagated by the media are proxies for popular 
sentiments.  However, it may be too old of an extrapolation to assume that 
recognition of the salience of crime problem translates into support for spe-
cific policies.215 
 
 208. Sex Offender Registry Act, N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168 (McKinney 1996). 
 209. Filler, supra note 176, at 330. 
 210. Id. at 352-53. 
 211. Id. at 349 (“When legislators recount gruesome crime narratives, they assist the me-
dia in reactivating old, popular crime stories.”). 
 212. For example, possessors of child pornography or offenders who had engaged in con-
sensual sex with a minor. 
 213. See JUVENILE JUSTICE SOURCEBOOK: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 18-19 (Albert Ro-
berts ed., 2004); BARRY KRISBERG, JUVENILE JUSTICE: REDEEMING OUR CHILDREN 3 (2005). 
 214. KRISBERG, supra note 213. 
 215. In a recent survey of public perceptions of white-collar crime, a majority of respon-
dents believed violent crime merits more severe punishment than white-collar crime. See 
Kristy Holtfreter et al., Public Perceptions of White Collar Crime and Punishment, 36 J. 
CRIM. JUST. 50, 57 (2008).  However, about two-thirds also supported providing equal or 
more resources to the government for the purposes of white-collar crime control. See id.  
These results demonstrate that public perception of the importance of a risk may not align 
directly with policy preferences. 
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“Soft on Crime” rhetoric—and the attendant fear of being labeled as 
such—leads to a lack of support for constitutionally protective criminal 
laws and policies, and instead drives support for harsh laws and punish-
ment.  The charge of being “soft on crime” is a frequent refrain during elec-
tion campaigns216 and a common source of partisan bickering.  For today’s 
political figures, the suggestion that one is too friendly to criminals may be 
as damaging as allegations of Communist sympathies were during the Cold 
War.217  Since at least the 1960s, judges have been accused of being “soft 
on crime,”218 which in part explains the diminishing role of judicial discre-
tion in many federal and state sentencing schemes.219  Opinion surveys 
from the 1970s to the 1990s indicate that this charge is believed by the pub-
lic, though in practice parole boards and prosecutors ultimately have the 
greatest influence on the length of sentences.220  The criticism is also levied 
against legislators and other elected officials, with tangible effects on crim-
inal legislation. 
Often legislators’ criminal justice views are morphed by the political 
demands of an elected seat.  An empirical analysis of House of Representa-
tives roll call votes from 1988 to 2004 lends quantitative support to the as-
sumption that votes for punitive policies cull public favor.221  Particularly, 
“Democrats who voted tough on crime . . . when crime was a highly salient 
issue” received more support come reelection, while those who did not had 
fewer votes.”222  ear of losing one’s seat to charges of “softness” on crime 
is manifested as two forms of pressure: to oppose bills intended to protect 
offenders’ constitutional rights and to support nearly any bill that increases 
the scope or severity of offenses.223  Kentucky’s groundbreaking Racial 
 
 216. See, e.g., Heidi Przybyla, Obama May Be Targeted By Republican Charges He’s 
Soft On Crime, BLOOMBERG, May 15, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid=aci 
Ah7jvN8Is&pid=20601070 (discussing charges of then presidential candidate Obama’s 
“soft on crime” record in the Illinois Senate).  Michael Dukakis’s loss in the 1988 presiden-
tial campaign is attributed to ads making similar claims. 
 217. See Sara Sun Beale, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Two Waves of Juvenile Jus-
tice Reforms as Seen from Jena, Louisiana, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 511, 533 (2009) 
(noting the shift began in the 1960s). 
 218. JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANS-
FORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 113-14 (2007). 
 219. See id. at 128. 
 220. Id. at 113. 
 221. See Jessica Bonney et al., Issue Accountability and the Mass Public: The Electoral 
Consequences of Legislative Voting on Crime Policy 8 (July 31, 2007) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://www.princeton.edu/~bcwrone/crimeaccountability.pdf. 
 222. Id. at 27. 
 223. President Obama’s vote against a bill creating a death penalty for gang members as 
an Illinois state senator was cited in an ad campaign questioning his crime politics, though 
the bill was ultimately vetoed by a Republican governor and, in Obama’s view, was unne-
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Justice Act, intended to reduce biased imposition of the death penalty, is an 
example of the former; the bill was passed in the face of opposition by the 
usual “soft on crime” detractors.224  As for the latter, increasingly bloated 
state criminal codes can be traced to legislators’ “common reluctance to 
appear ‘soft on crime.’”225  According to one view, state legislatures have 
become “‘offense factories,’ churning out more and more narrow, unneces-
sary and often counterproductive new offenses.”226  The problem of duplic-
ative and/or contradictory offenses makes the law less accessible to lay 
people,227 compromises the “rule of law” by introducing too much police 
and prosecutorial discretion,228 complicates judicial interpretation of sta-
tutes,229 destroys the consistency of terms that was one of the more appeal-
ing features of the Model Penal Code reforms,230 and results in inconsistent 
punishment schemes.231  While legislators themselves may recognize these 
drawbacks, their participation in the creation of new offenses is a matter of 
political expediency resistant to change: 
When a new and unnecessary specific offense, such as “library theft,” is 
proposed, the issue becomes a referendum on whether legislators care 
about public libraries, not on whether the proposed legislation will actual-
ly do anything to combat the problem of theft or will instead have perni-
cious ramifications for the application of the criminal code’s general theft 
provision.  As a result, the rational legislator is likely to vote in favor of 
the library theft bill because there is a clear constituency—library users, 
and taxpayers generally—that will benefit from its enactment, and no 
constituency to complain about the new provision’s more subtle and dif-
fuse drawbacks.232 
 
cessary due to “sufficient laws on the books.” See Heidi Przybyla, supra note 216.  The at-
tention is an illustration of the public assumption that any crime law should be endorsed. 
 224. See Justin R. Arnold, Note, Race and the Death Penalty After McCleskey: A Case 
Study of Kentucky’s Racial Justice Act, 12 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 93, 102-
03 (2005).  The bill’s sponsor famously characterized the provision as not soft on crime, but 
strong on justice. Id. 
 225. Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of American 
Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 644 (2005).  Dawn Clark Netsch, a former Illinois 
state senator, characterized the political climate as an “enormous, almost hydraulic pressure 
to pass any criminal law bill that is offered, unless you don’t care about [keeping] the job.” 
Id. at 634. 
 226. Id. at 634. 
 227. Id. at 638. 
 228. Id. at 639. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 640. 
 231. Id. at 641. 
 232. Id. at 644-45. 
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Political pressure to pass a bill may result in hasty and poorly planned 
legislation.  The dramatic change in the treatment of juvenile offenders in 
New York in the late 1970s can be traced to a particular high-profile crime 
and political climate.  When Willie Bosket shot and killed two subway pas-
sengers in the course of a robbery, the juvenile court with sole jurisdiction 
over the fifteen-year-old provided for his release at age twenty-one.233  The 
crime and sentencing occurred in the midst of a reelection campaign of 
Governor Hugh Carey, who had been labeled “soft on crime” by his detrac-
tors.234  Two weeks later, he called the legislature into a special session to 
modify the law to permit transfers of juveniles to criminal court when 
charged with particular offenses.235  President Clinton’s reelection cam-
paign, coupled with fears aroused by the Oklahoma City bombing, are si-
milarly credited with the passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996, which limited habeas corpus relief and reduced feder-
al review of death penalty sentences.236  While legislators and executives 
are more likely to cast criminal reform in moral terms, their ulterior—or 
complementary—political motives cannot be ignored.  “The news media 
are not mirrors, simply reflecting events in society.  Rather, media content 
is shaped by economic and marketing considerations that frequently over-
ride traditional journalistic criteria for newsworthiness.”237 
Media also influences political acquiescence in or support for particular-
ly harsh policies on crime and offenders.  For example, if we broaden the 
scope of public policy beyond legislative evidence, we see other examples 
of ways the media’s intense coverage of an issue can influence public opi-
nion and, thereby, affect policymaking.  Joseph Arpaio, the sheriff of Mari-
copa County, Arizona, offers an example.  He proclaims himself “Ameri-
ca’s Toughest Sheriff” and has earned that distinction by adopting harsh, 
unorthodox practices in his jail that draw media attention locally,238 nation-
 
 233. See Beale, supra note 217, at 534. 
 234. Id. 
 235. The result was the Juvenile Offender Act of 1978, 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 478. 
 236. See Kenneth Williams, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: What’s 
Wrong With It and How to Fix It, 33 CONN. L. REV. 919, 923 (2001) (explaining that Clinton 
wanted to “avoid charges that he was ‘soft’ on crime”).  Clinton’s signing of a bill the same 
year rejecting a Sentencing Commission’s recommendation to reduce the disparity in pu-
nishments for crack and cocaine possession was also seen as a way of combating Republi-
can criticism in an election year. See William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards 
a Rational Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1233, 1282 n.301 (1996) (citing 
Crack-Based Racial Bias, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 28 1995, at B6). 
 237. Beale, supra note 12, at 397-98. 
 238. See generally, e.g., Daniel Gonzalez, Advocate Strikes Back on Arpaio Crime 
Sweeps, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Jan. 3, 2010), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2010/ 
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ally,239 and even internationally.240  The more outrageous the approach, the 
more likely the sheriff will garner attention and the more likely that he will 
continue to shape and benefit from appearing to be someone who is willing 
to take a hard stance against offenders.  His reelection by Maricopa County 
voters by double-digit margins in 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 only served 
as positive reinforcement for a man who appears to crave notoriety.  In-
deed, Arpaio’s support and the public’s acceptance of his outrageous poli-
cies hinge on public fear, outrage, and distaste for offenders. 
Arpaio made his first appearance on the national stage in 1995 when he 
reinstituted chain gangs.  There was certainly no evidence that chain gangs 
served any purpose of punishment other than embarrassing the inmates and 
gaining notoriety for the sheriff.  But given the massive amount of attention 
he received, Arpaio began expanding this practice to women offenders in 
1996 and then to juvenile offenders.  Arpaio’s next controversial move was 
to set up a “tent city” as a way to address jail overcrowding without build-
ing a new jail.  Given the extreme temperatures in Phoenix—with daytime 
temperatures inside the tents reportedly reaching highs of 150 degrees in 
the top bunks241—the tent city drew the attention of civil liberties organiza-
tions and the media and reinforced Arpaio’s efforts to take increasingly 
controversial steps.  Perhaps his most famous action remains his choice to 
require that inmates wear underwear.242  In 2005, he marched nearly seven 
hundred maximum-security prisoners four blocks from Towers Jail to the 
newly opened Lower Buckeye jail wearing only pink underwear and flip-
flops.243  The sheriff claimed that the minimal clothing was intended to 
prevent the concealment of keys.244  The policies that Arpaio institutes cer-
tainly enable him to make a name for himself.  Indeed, the press coverage 
that he received due to the pink underwear enabled him to extend the use of 
 
01/03/20100103immig-raid0103.html; Sheriff Joe: An In-Depth Look at ‘America’s Tough-
est Sheriff,’ ARIZ. REPUBLIC, http://www.azcentral.com/news/arpaio/arpaio-jailer.html. 
 239. See generally, e.g., Martin Bashir & Max Culhane, ‘America’s Toughest Sheriff’ 
Unapologetic About Tactics, Inmate Treatment, ABC NEWS/NIGHTLINE (Dec. 14, 2009), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/sheriff-joe-arpaio-unapologetic-tactics-illegal-immigrant-
crackdowns/story?id=9219341; Jacques Billeaud & Amanda Lee Myers, Arizona’s Sheriff 
Joe Arpaio Not Relenting on Immigration Enforement, CNSNEWS.COM (July 30, 2010), 
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/70260; The Board: America’s Worst Sheriff (Joe Ar-
paio), N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2008, 17:13 EST), http://theboard.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/ 
31/americas-worst-sheriff-joe-arpaio/. 
 240.  See, e.g., Charley James, Inside Joe Arpaio: Arizona Deputy Calls Him A “Dis-
grace To The Department,” UK PROGRESSIVE (May 4, 2009), http://www.ukprogressive.co. 
uk/inside-joe-arpaio-az-deputy-calls-him-a-”disgrace-to-the-department”/article4402.html. 
 241.  See id. 
 242.  See id. 
 243.  See id. 
 244.  See id. 
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the color to handcuffs, which he used to promote a book that he had written 
about himself.  But the policies have yet to establish that they do anything 
more than violate inmates’ human and civil rights.245  Yet, his policies con-
tinue. 
III.  WHY DOES THIS HAPPEN? 
Market salience is the relevant predictor of the content of the news.  The 
way that the news is produced and the priorities of and pressures facing 
news organizations as businesses determine the content of the news.  This 
is especially true when it comes to news coverage of crime.  This Article 
lays out a preliminary discussion of market salience and news media crime 
coverage in the context of newspaper and television news.  A discussion of 
Internet news sources and “new media” is beyond the scope of this Article. 
A. State of the News Media Field 
The preponderance of crime reporting in mainstream news media, as 
well as the selection of crimes to report and the way they are reported are in 
many ways determined by realities and pressures of journalism, as prac-
ticed in newsrooms by individual reporters.  Reporters are under considera-
ble pressure to produce enough quality, sufficiently “newsworthy” content 
to fill each edition of a newspaper.246  Depending on the paper, there is a 
lot of space to fill.  This is especially true in this day of twenty-four hour 
news coverage when many newspapers maintain websites, which need to 
be updated with content in real time.  In the context of newspaper report-
ing, the pressure is even greater on the individual reporter because signifi-
cant staff cuts in the wake of economic downtown and steadily declining 
circulations have increased the difficulty of producing news content.247 
Coverage of crime is attractive because crime news is plentiful and very 
easy to produce.  Despite falling crime rates, crime occurs reliably.  Fur-
ther, there are information dissemination procedures and practices in place 
that make crime information easy for reporters to obtain.  Reporters use 
press releases issued by district attorneys’ offices, and briefings from police 
department public information officers to write crime stories.  Moreover, if 
an editor or producer has additional space that he or she needs to fill and 
 
 245.  See, e.g., Graves v. Arpaio, 633 F. Supp. 2d 834 (D. Ariz. 2009), aff’d, 623 F.3d 
1043 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 246. See Beale, supra note 12, at 421-22. 
 247. See RONALD K.L. COLLINS, DICTATING CONTENT: HOW ADVERTISING PRESSURE CAN 
CORRUPT A FREE PRESS 32-49 (1992). 
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there has not been enough crime locally, he or she can obtain crime stories 
from the Associated Press. 
1. Crime is Easy and Cheap to Cover 
News media outlets are under pressure to produce news coverage that 
will attract an audience. This has a significant effect on what it is that is 
deemed “newsworthy.”  Further, especially in the case of televised or inter-
net-based news coverage, there are usually several different outlets compet-
ing for the same audience in the same market.  Thus, each news media or-
ganization must strive to make its programming more appealing than that 
of its competitors, attracting the most viewers or readers—which in turn at-
tracts advertisers and revenue.  To do so, it must show its audience what 
they want to see: news that is engaging, interesting to watch, and relevant 
to their concerns.248  One may also infer that news audiences are most re-
ceptive to news presentations that reflect their own values, or at least do not 
challenge important values explicitly.  This is a sea change from traditional 
journalistic notions of “newsworthiness,” focused on informing the public 
about important issues—”what they need” to know, rather than what they 
might want to read.249 
a. Financial Pressures, Marketing, and Televised News 
Beginning in the 1990s, the profitability of network televised news be-
gan to erode due to increased competition (cable news, the Internet), de-
creased audience for network news, and lifestyle changes that undermined 
the ability of potential viewers to watch televised news during traditional 
airing times such as the dinner hour.  At this time, many networks were al-
so purchased by large corporations that demanded more efficiency and a 
greater profit margin.250  As a result of these pressures, television network 
 
 248. See PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, Network TV: Summary Essay, THE 
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news companies have striven to make its product more entertaining, create 
more content, and reduce the cost of creating it.251 
The amount of news time devoted to crime stories and the way those sto-
ries are presented are affected by perceived viewer demand.  In other 
words, in order to attract more viewers and thus more revenue, television 
stations and newspapers will make their content more attractive to those 
viewers by giving them what the news organization believes they want and 
like to see.252  This meant an increase in crime stories253 and an emphasis 
on other types of “soft news” and entertainment-like content, and the eli-
mination of foreign news bureaus and other “hard news” producing me-
chanisms that are more expensive to maintain.  Sensational coverage of 
crime was perfect for this purpose.254  Further, the fact that television is a 
visual medium akin to film means that television emphasizes stories that 
are “discrete, dramatic, visual incidents between individuals,” rather than 
more abstract stories about public policy or the political system.255 
Also taken into account are advertising strategies privileging the attrac-
tion of viewers in more desirable, higher-spending demographics.  These 
demographics may in turn have a perceived taste for more graphic, violent, 
and shocking content.256  Thus, the level of violent crime portrayed in the 
news is calibrated according to the target audiences they seek to attract and 
the products to be advertised to them.  Violence is manipulated to “estab-
lish specific brand identities, increase viewership during periods when local 
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advertising rates are set, and counter especially popular programming on 
competitors’ channels.”257 
b. Financial Pressures, Marketing, and Newspapers 
Newspapers, just as television news, are also driven and constrained by 
market considerations.  Typically, newspapers are publically owned and 
thus under pressure to develop value for their shareholders.  Like televised 
news, newspapers face this pressure to generate high profits while at the 
same time confronting declining readership and increasing competition.  As 
a result, newspapers and the content they generate are increasingly influ-
enced by marketing considerations.  Moreover, in giving consideration to 
marketing, they must keep in mind not only their own brand, but the mar-
keting goals of their advertisers.258 
2. Journalists, Like the Public, Embrace and Perpetuate Stereotypes and 
Misperceptions 
“Journalists, unconsciously or consciously, ‘cast modern experience in 
terms of myth.’”  For this reason, stories about crimes involving race, eth-
nicity, gender, class, or religion may be reported as, or constructed to fit 
“stereotypical, mythological formula of . . . stor[ies] long loved by the pub-
lic.”259  In other words, crime stories that reinforce the socially beloved 
narratives that inform a certain worldview are likely to be reported promi-
nently.  The narratives that are chosen are presumably informed by the me-
ta-values of the media as a social institution.  That is to say, the role of the 
media is to inform and shape public opinion, and because the media is con-
trolled by social elites, it is employed to reaffirm existing systems of pow-
er.  This is the drive behind the uneven presentation of race in the media, 
particularly in crime stories.260  According to Entman and Gross, almost all 
research “reveals a consistent bias against” black people, particularly black 
defendants in the media.261  At the same time, almost everything presented 
in news reinforces white privilege and the idea of a racial hierarchy with 
white people at the top.262 
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Conversely, newsmakers are drawn to stories that will shock and sensa-
tionalize. Thus, they may also be drawn to stories that defy existing expec-
tations.  However, Entman and Gross claim that these stories, of which the 
Duke Lacrosse story is one example, are the exceptions that prove the 
rule.263  One reason why it received such a great deal of media coverage is 
because it defied expectations, which were themselves created by other 
media trends.264 
According to Pollak, “events that appear to disrupt expectations . . . are 
the stuff of news.”265  Further, a “law of opposites” is at work in news re-
porting in that the most common crimes (according to official crime statis-
tics) are the least represented in the news, and the most sensational, least 
common crimes get the most coverage.  This is because these crimes are 
often the most violent, sensational crimes and thus the most titillating for 
the audience of the news organization.266  As a result of this reporting 
trend, the public is more likely to perceive the least common crimes as far 
more common than they are in reality.267  According to Jewkes, crime sto-
ries become more newsworthy based on the following factors, or news val-
ues: how common the crime is; the risk that news consumers might be vic-
timized; whether the crime has a sexual aspect to it; whether the crime 
involves a celebrity or high status individual; whether the crime occurred 
locally; the level of violence; the presence of graphic imagery; and whether 
youth are involved.268 
Further, biases of the individual reporters as well as the rational, market-
ing focused priorities of the organization not only determine which stories 
are published or aired and how, but also how the people and events that 
form the bases of the stories are characterized and discussed. 
3. Bias May Flow From Where the News Media Get Their Information 
An important question raised by the practice of obtaining crime informa-
tion from police stations and district attorneys is the question of bias.  Giv-
en that both of these sources are in the business of apprehending and trying 
to punish criminals, or alleged criminals, it is possible that relying on them 
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as sources of news may have the effect of creating news that is biased 
against alleged criminals and in favor of prosecutors.  The Duke Lacrosse 
rape scandal and the way it played out in the media is a good illustration of 
both this phenomenon (relying on police and DA sources for crime infor-
mation) and its effects.269  In that situation, many members of the media 
took information directly from the District Attorney, failed to examine the 
other side of the story, and called for a quick conviction without critically 
examining documents or assessing the credibility of sources.  In this situa-
tion, as in many others, the presumption of innocence is largely treated as a 
formality.270  According to one study of Los Angeles television news that 
reports that twenty-seven percent of criminal suspects are described using 
prejudicial information, most of it cited to law enforcement or official 
sources used because they are easy to access and presumably credible.271 
B. A Need for Oversight 
Reclaiming the high ground in criminal justice policy-making requires 
monitoring and oversight to track the degree of distortion that occurs.  And, 
equally important, there is a genuine need for a watchdog role to track and 
expose the misinformation to the general public.  Currently, such oversight 
is sorely lacking.  Scholars have certainly raised awareness of the problem 
of media distortion and exaggeration in reporting, as well as exposing the 
political opportunism that inevitably flows from such distortion and infects 
public policy.  But too often that important debate is confined to academic 
circles or arenas that the public does not typically access.  Similarly, crimi-
nal justice actors and politicians may be aware of the effects of sound-bite 
policy, but they lack the stage, staying power, or incentives to raise the is-
sues in a broader public setting.  So, sound-bite based criminal justice poli-
cy-making continues to flourish almost without challenge. 
But what might occur if one were to look for ways to challenge this phe-
nomenon?  One option might be to exhort the media to police itself.  As 
with other professions, such as medicine, law, and business, the media 
could rely on its own professional ethics to raise question about—and com-
pel examination of—its choices and their impact on policy-making. While 
one might question whether professional ethics are up to the task, ethics in 
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journalism might offer more hope than in many other professions.  Media 
professionals not only acknowledge the significance of their role in a free 
society, but are often quite cognizant of the power they wield.  It is the 
ideals of the profession—to tell the truth to power even in the midst of 
countervailing forces that seek to distort or suppress it—that draws many 
into the profession.  And it is that dogged determination to get the story 
right that could offer some measure of hope that the media might monitor 
itself.  Granted, not all individual reporters are motivated by such ideals.  
Still, reporters generally at least acknowledge and embrace the need for ac-
curacy and truth in reporting.  But it is at the editorial or management le-
vels where the concern about self-monitoring surfaces and raises question.  
There, we see the direct impact of market forces to attract a maximum au-
dience and advertisers.272  We see coverage choices governed more by 
viewership and profitability273 than truth and accuracy.  So, it is not surpris-
ing that, thus far, self-policing mechanisms seem to have failed to provide 
adequate protection. 
Reclaiming the high ground in policy-making also demands closer ex-
amination and oversight of political leaders and their legislative agendas.  
Legislators are driven by a different form of “market force”: the desire for 
election.  Too often, that drive encourages the politician to seek media at-
tention through hype and hyperbole and to adopt legislative stances that 
seem to respond to and exploit issues raised by and in the media.  While 
scholars and criminal justice actors urge the adoption of evidence-based 
policy-making in their own circles, policymakers have not typically felt 
compelled to create environments where evidence-based and evidence-
inspired274 policies can be debated, evaluated, and implemented. 
At various points in our history—and largely due to political or financial 
forces—legislators have looked to examine and be guided by the impact of 
their legislation.  Environmentalists in the 1970s managed to use their po-
litical clout at a time when there was greater national receptivity to the idea 
of environmental protection to demand that environmental impact state-
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ments accompany any legislation that might adversely affect the environ-
ment.275  Taking a page from that playbook, if legislators are going to pro-
vide their own oversight, one might suggest in any criminal justice legisla-
tion the inclusion of “Correctional Impact Statements.”  These statements 
would require a vigorous review of the financial and correctional impact of 
any new legislative initiatives.  Like an environment impact study, this 
would at least raise awareness of the cost of legislation and might encour-
age greater scrutiny of its effectiveness in light of that cost.  The goal of 
this new correctional assessment would be to move legislatures toward evi-
dence-based policy-making. 
Of course, even without correctional impact statements, we might in this 
time in our history begin to see greater attention on costs of legislation giv-
en the pervasive impact of and concern about the global economic crisis.  
The media and the public have heightened their concern about the fiscal 
choices that elected officials make in light of the lingering effects of the fi-
nancial crisis on the local and national economy.  The fact that citizens are 
losing their jobs and facing an uncertain financial future has shifted indi-
vidual and public priorities toward fiscal conservatism and forced greater 
scrutiny of politicians’ choices to engage government and taxpayer re-
sources.  Thus, the political and financial environment could begin to move 
politicians toward greater focus on evidence-based policy-making. 
But political and financial environments shift.  And the existence and 
proliferation of political oversight groups suggests a pervasive distrust that 
politicians will be sufficiently motivated or capable of policing themselves.  
So, we might look for a political group or think tank to shine a light on the 
relationship between media distortion and criminal justice policy making.  
Of course, no such committee or group has emerged with any degree of ef-
fectiveness.  Moreover, oversight committees and even “think tank” eval-
uations of public policy have often become mired in party politics such that 
they lose their effectiveness. 
Given these challenges, genuine oversight of both the media and legisla-
tors may need to come from a source that technically lies outside the media 
profession and the political domain, but still has the potential to reach the 
public directly: social media.  The impact of social media is just beginning 
to be examined.  But we already see signs of its impact.  Bloggers and indi-
viduals who use Twitter already provide real-time in-depth exposure to and 
analysis of events.  They offer their followers more information than con-
ventional media, taking the time to fill in details and commentary that con-
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ventional media either lacks or simply limits.  Indeed, blogs have created 
such a demand for more in depth coverage of stories that newspapers such 
as the New York Times now offer additional information on their website 
about stories printed in the paper.  This additional information coupled with 
readers’ ability to respond and ask questions of the reporters and column-
ists is far more comprehensive than traditional “letters to the editor.” 
Arguably, this involvement of the social media into the world of conven-
tional journalism has begun to affect the substance and type of reporting.  If 
criminal justice actors or academics who understand the distorting effect of 
reporting were to use social media more comprehensively than they cur-
rently do, a more nuanced debate could potentially take place.  No longer 
confined to academic circles, a debate about accuracy and impact could oc-
cur on social networking sites, such as Facebook, and in blogs that would 
engage greater numbers of the public in critical discussions of the accuracy 
of what the media provides. 
CONCLUSION 
The impact of media on the development and implementation of public 
policy initiatives concerning crime are sure to continue.  However, when it 
comes to crime coverage, programming suggests greater frequency and 
more violence than actually occurs.  Politicians, wanting to appear respon-
sive to this faux-increase in crime, often devise legislative “solutions” that 
have no basis in fact.  These legislative efforts often make the problem 
worse.  The question then becomes: Who is best positioned to provide 
oversight for both the media and legislatures that respond to this exagge-
rated coverage? 
Market forces militate against self-policing by the media.  In the same 
vein, elected officials often wary of being labeled “soft on crime” do not 
have the support to lead with evidence.  Ironically, new social media may 
provide some level of review in both places.  Ultimately, it is the public 
that will need to demand more from both elected officials and the “Fourth 
Estate.” 
